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The Texas Family Code was amended in 1989 during the Regular
Session of the 71st Texas Legislature with respect to suport for adult
disabled children.1 The amendments included an amendment to subsection 14.05(b) and the addition of section 14.05 1.2 Section 14.051
authorizes a court to order indefinite support for a disabled minor or
adult child, whether suit is filed before or after the child turns eighteen, if the child's disability exists, or if the cause of the disability is
known to exist, before the child turns eighteen.
This article will explore the background and history of this legislation and provide a subsection-by-subsection analysis of the new Family Code section 14.051.1
1. See Act of May 26, 1989, ch. 368, §§ 1-2, 1989 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 1457 (Vernon).
2. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 14.05(b), 14.051 (Vernon Supp. 1991).
3. See id. at § 14.051.
4. Much of the background behind this legislation, as reported in this article, was
researched for a prior article by the author. See Price, Duty to Support Minor and Adult Children: Common Law, Statutory and Contractual,in SOUTHERN METHODIST UNIV. SCHOOL OF
LAW, TEXAS FAMILY LAW AND COMMUNITY PROPERTY ch. E (1988) [hereinafter Price].
See generally Cole, Draftingand EnforcingFamily Law Judgments:Problems ofEducating and
Supporting After Age Eighteen, in STATE BAR OF TEXAS, ST. MARY'S SEVENTH ANNUAL
PROCEDURAL INSTITUTE:

PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF FAMILY LAW ch. F (1985).

Other

commentary has briefly addressed this new legislation. Flores & Dubove, State Bar Legislative
Program: FinalDisposition by 71st Legislature, 52 TEX. B.J. 890, 891 (1989); Kazen, Comment
on Fam. C. § 14,051, in 1989 TEXAS FAMILY CODE LEGISLATION, 7 TEX. FAM. L. RPTR. 1718 (Aug. 1989); Sampson, Amendments to Titles 1, 2 & 3 Texas Family Code, in 1989, 1
STATE BAR [OF TEXAS] SEC. RPT., FAMILY LAW, 1989 LEGISLATION AFFECTING FAMILY LAW PRACTICE - THE 71ST LEGISLATURE, REGULAR SESSION 3739 (Spec. Legis. Issue - Pt. One 1989) [hereinafter Sampson].
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BACKGROUND: PARENT'S DUTY TO SUPPORT

Generally

1. General Rule: Duty Ends at Majority
A parent has a moral and legal duty to support a child.5 The general rule regarding the duration of the legal duty to support is that the

duty exists during an unemancipated child's minority and traditionally ends when the child reaches majority.6 This general "duration
5. See generally H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES §§ 6.2, 6.3 (2d ed. 1988) [hereinafter CLARK]; H. KRAUSE, CHILD SUPPORT IN
AMERICA - THE LEGAL PERSPECTIVE (1981) [hereinafter KRAUSE]; J. LIEBERMAN, CHILD
SUPPORT IN AMERICA 2 (1986) [hereinafter LIEBERMAN]; 67A C.J.S. Parentand Child § 49,
at 322-26 (1978); Foster, RelationalInterests of the Family, 1962 UNIV. ILL. L. FORUM 493,
512; Price, supra note 4, at E-2. Child support is a substantive right recognized at commonlaw. 67A C.J.S., supra § 49, at 324. As a facet of the parent-child relationship, a child's
statutory right to financial support from or through its natural parent is protected under the
equal protection clause. The United States Supreme Court has made its position clear in several cases in which it struck down state legislation which discriminated between legitimate and
illegitimate children. See Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 537-38 (1973) (per curiam) (struck
down Texas statute authorizing child support to legitimate children but denying it to illegitimate children); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 176 (1972) (struck down Louisiana statute denying workers compensation benefits equally to legitimate and illegitimate
children); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 70-71 (1968) (struck down Louisiana statute which
had been construed to deny illegitimate children wrongful death recoveries equal to those of
legitimate children). Generally, in Texas, only a parent has a duty to support a child (natural
or adopted). See, e.g., Mata v. Moreno, 601 S.W.2d 58, 59 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1980, no writ); see also TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 4.02, 12.04(3), 14.05(a),(b), 14.051
(b),(c),(g),(h) (Vernon Supp. 1991); Price, supra note 4, at E-2 to E-3. The duty to support
means the duty to supply the child at least with necessaries. See, e.g.; Drexel v. McCutcheon,
604 S.W.2d 430, 433 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1980, no writ) (attorney's fees as necessaries);
Cordell v. Cordell, 592 S.W.2d 84, 86 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1979, no writ) (both before
and after divorce); see also TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 4.02 (Vernon Supp. 1991). The support
required includes providing the child with necessary food, shelter, clothing, medical care and
education. See, e.g., Gully v. Gully, Ill Tex. 233, 241, 231 S.W. 97, 100 (1921); Lawrence v.
Cox, 464 S.W.2d 674, 675 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1971, writ dism'd); Mitchell v. Davis, 205
S.W.2d 812, 813-14 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1947, writ ref'd); Maxwell v. Maxwell, 204
S.W.2d 32, 37 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1947, writ ref'd n.r.e); Price v. Price, 197 S.W.2d
200, 202 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1946, writ ref'd); Chancellor v. Chancellor, 23 S.W.2d 761,
764 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1929, writ ref'd) (adopted and natural children treated the
same with respect to support duty); see also TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 4.02, 12.04(3) (Vernon
Supp. 1991). A minor or adult child has no legal duty to support a parent. See, e.g., MissouriKansas-Texas R.R. Co. v. Pierce, 519 S.W.2d 157, 159 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1975, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
6. The duty to support begins at least at birth and continues until legally terminated. See,
e.g., Hustace v. Black, 191 S.W.2d 82, 85 (Tex. Civ. App.- El Paso 1945, writ ref'd); 67A
C.J.S., supra note 5, § 55(b), at 342-43; see also CLARK, supra note 5, § 17.1; 67A C.J.S., supra
note 5, §§ 55, 62. See generally Annotation, Parent's Obligation to Support Adult Child, I
A.L.R.2d 910 (1948); Price, supra note 4. The age of majority at common law was 21, but
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rule" is recognized at common law7 and has been codified in Texas' as
well as in other jurisdictions.9
2.

Exceptions: Education and Disability

The general duration rule has two primary exceptions which may
be referred to as the "education exception" and the "disability exception."1 These exceptions impose a duty upon a parent to support an
adult child. As may be expected, the exceptions are premised upon a
societal perception that although a person may legally be classified as
an adult, the person may still need some assistance to attain something society deems a necessity."1
The "education exception" requires a parent to support an adult
child for a reasonable time until he has completed, or has had the
opportunity to complete, some phase of formal education, such as
graduation from high school or college.12 Although this exception is
today, by statute, it is eighteen in virtually all states. See, e.g., TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE
ANN. § 129.001 (Vernon 1986) (age of majority in Texas is 18); see also KRAUSE, supra note 5,
at 29. The general duty to support, as well as an order for child support, may end prematurely
if the child becomes emancipated in the eyes of the law during minority. See, e.g., CLARK,
supra note 5, §§ 8.3, 17.1; Price, supra note 4, at E-16 to E-18. State statutes may require the
termination during minority of a legal duty to support in some circumstances. See, e.g., TEX.
FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.05(d) (Vernon 1986).
7. See infra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
8. See, e.g., TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 4.02, 11.01(1), 12.04(3), 14.05(a) (Vernon Supp.
1991).
9. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 466-84 (West 1990).
10. See generally CLARK, supra note 5, § 6.2; 67A C.J,S., supra note 5, §§ 62-63 (1978);
Price, supra note 4, at E-8 to E-1 1, E-38 to E-57. The phrases "educational exception" and
"disability exception" are those of the author's.
11. Traditionally, legal duties, which often derive from moral obligations, extend support
to incompetent persons unable to provide for themselves, such as parental support for incompetent adult children. See KRAUSE, supra note 5, at 32. A child's individual parents or other
relatives usually bear the cost of his support until the burden becomes so great that society
must, or should in fairness, bear the cost in whole or in part.
12. See, e.g., CLARK, supra note 5, § 6.2; Price, supra note 4, at E-8 to E-9. As noted, the
duty to support includes the duty to provide the child with an education. See supra note 5.
When majority was at age 21, this duty to educate a minor would have covered all or a substantial part of postsecondary education (e.g., college); however, with the age of majority now
set at 18 in most states (e.g., Texas), see supra KRAUSE note 5, at 29, this generally precludes
the duty to support the child through postsecondary educational endeavors. Absent a statutory requirement, even if an exceptionally bright child sought a postsecondary education
before age eighteen, such education would generally have to be declared to be a "necessary"
before a parent could be legally obligated for this support. At least one Texas case has treated
postsecondary education not as a "necessary" for a minor but only as a "special advantage."
Woodruff v. Woodruff, 487 S.W.2d 791, 793 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1972, no writ). But
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beyond the scope of this article,' 3 Texas currently recognizes that a
parent's general duty to support may continue into the child's adulthood to assist the child in graduating from high school. 4

The "disability exception" obligates a parent to support a disabled
adult child who is physically or mentally incapable of caring for or

supporting himself.' 5 Many jurisdictions recognize that a parent has
a common-law duty to support an adult child who is disabled and

incapable of taking care of himself.' 6 Most of these jurisdictions condition this continuing duty upon the child already being disabled
before reaching majority.17 Once a healthy child becomes an adult,
however, most jurisdictions hold that a postmajority disability does

not re-impose a legal common-law duty to support a child.'5 Statu-

cf Ex parte Woodruff, 483 S.W.2d 951, 956 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1972, original proceeding) (per curiam) (dicta, stating relator's "living expenses," including "college expenses"
for his minor child by new marriage, were generally reasonable and necessary), writ dism'd
w.o.j per curiam, 487 S.W.2d 692 (Tex. 1972) (two Woodruff cases involved same man); see
also Bohn v. Bohn, 455 S.W.2d 401, 415 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1970, writ
dism'd) (trial court could place father's separate property stock in trust to pay child's college
education during minority). Texas will probably join the growing trend which recognizes postsecondary education as a necessary; see infra note 13 and accompanying text; however, it may
unfortunately be some years before this is codified.
13. Other sources discuss the moral and, increasingly, legal duty of parents to support the
postsecondary educational efforts of children for a reasonable time. See generally CLARK,
supra note 5, at § 6.2; LIEBERMAN, supra note 5, at 13; Horan, Postminority Support for College Education - A Legally Enforceable Obligation in Divorce Proceedings?,20 FAM. L.Q. 589
(1987); Price, supra note 4, at E-8 to E-9; Annotation, Postsecondary Education as Within
Nondivorced Parent'sChild Support Obligation,42 A.L.R.4th 819 (1985); Annotation, Responsibility of Noncustodial Divorced Parent to Pay For, or Contribute to, Cost of Child's College
Education, 99 A.L.R.3d 322 (1980); Annotation, Parent'sObligation to Support Adult Child, 1
A.L.R.2d 910 (1948).
14. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 4.02, 14.05(a) (Vernon Supp. 1991).
15. See, e.g., CLARK, supra note 5, § 6.2; KRAUSE, supra note 5, at 32; Price, supra note
4, at E-10 to E-I 1, E-39 to E-40. See generally Note, Domestic Relations - Child Support Parental Duty to Support a Subnormal Adult Child, 48 Miss. L.J. 361 (1977); Note, Child
Support - ParentalObligation to Support Adult ChildrenHeld Strictly Limited to Circumstances
Enumerated by Statute, 9 So. TEX. L.J. 101 (1967); Annotation, Postmajority Disability as
Reviving Parental Duty to Support Child, 48 A.L.R.4th 919 (1986) [hereinafter Postmajority
Disability Support]; Parent'sObligation to Support Adult Child 1 A.L.R.2d 910 (1948).

16. See, e.g., Ex Parte Bayliss, 550 So. 2d 986, 988 (Ala. 1989); Towery v. Towery, 685
S.W.2d 155, 157 (Ark. 1985); see also PostmajorityDisability Support, supra note 15, at 926.
17. See supra note 16. These courts reasoned that a minor's incompetency due to a con-

tinuing physical or mental disability prevents the child from becoming emancipated at the time
of majority and, therefore, the child remains a "minor" in the eyes of the law. Further, most
jurisdictions do not require that the child reside with the parents before the obligation to support the adult disabled child is imposed.
18. See supra note 16; see also Price, supra note 4, at E-1 1. If the child is not disabled
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tory law has also been used to impose a parental duty to support a
disabled adult child, either expressly' 9 or constructively.2 0
3.

Contractual Duties

Finally, absent law or policy to the contrary, a parent may obligate
himself by agreement or contract to support a minor or an adult child
for any period of time, whether the child is healthy or not and regardless of the purpose or intent behind the support.2
B.

The Texas Experience
1. Generally

By case law and statute, Texas has followed the traditional common-law rule that imposes upon a parent the general duty to support
an unemancipated minor child.2 2 Numerous cases, and now statutes,
also adopt the general common-law rule that the duty to support usuupon reaching majority, then the child becomes emancipated and, therefore, an adult, and the
parent-child relationship ends and cannot be reinstated at some future date based on an unforeseen disability. See id. There is, however, at least one court which has re-imposed the duty
to support even when the disability came to fruition after majority. See Sininger v. Sininger,
479 A.2d 1354 (Md. 1984) (discussed infra notes 53, 133).
19. Only a few state statutes expressly address the availability of child support for adult
disabled children. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-2451, 12-2453 (West 1982 & Supp.
1990); HAW. REV. STAT. § 580-47 (1985 & Supp. 1989); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, para. 513
(Smith-Hurd 1980 & Supp. 1990); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.051 (Vernon Supp. 1991). The
Illinois statute was upheld as constitutional. Kujawinski v. Kujawinski, 376 N.E.2d 1382,
1391 (Ill. 1978).
20. The majority of state statutes authorize support for children without indicating
whether support may be ordered past majority. See CLARK, supra note 5, § 17.1. The vast
majority of these states have construed their statutes to require support for an adult disabled
child. See id.; see also CLARK, supra, § 6.2. See generally Postmajority Disability Support,
supra note 15.
21. See, e.g., CLARK, supra note 5, § 17.1; infra text accompanying notes 26, 207-09, 22224.
22. See, e.g., Cunningham v. Cunningham, 120 Tex. 491, 497, 40 S.W.2d 46, 48 (1931);
Gully v. Gully, 111 Tex. 233, 241, 231 S.W. 97, 100 (1921); Martinez v. State, 307 S.W.2d 259,
261-62 (Tex. Crim. App. 1957); Houtchens v. Matthews, 557 S.W.2d 581, 584 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Fort Worth 1977, writ dism'd); see also TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 4.02, 12.04(6)
(Vernon Supp. 1991). See generally Parental Rights and Duties, in 4 FAMILY LAW - TEXAS
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 90.01[5] (Kazen ed. 1990). Parents have an equal duty to support, limited only by their respective abilities to do so. See, e.g., Thompson v. Thompson, 572
S.W.2d 761, 765 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1978, no writ); Friedman v. Friedman, 521 S.W.2d
111, 114-15 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1975, no writ); Bernard v. Bernard, 491
S.W.2d 222, 224 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1973, no writ). See generally Price,
supra note 4, at E-2, E-19.
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ally ends when the child reaches majority. 23 No Texas case has expressly adopted either the "education exception" or the "disability

exception" to the general common-law duration rule,24 although both
are now expressly recognized in certain respects by statute. 25 Texas
courts do recognize and enforce a parent's contractual obligation to
support an adult child.26
23. See, e.g., Ex parte Williams, 420 S.W.2d 135, 136-37 (Tex. 1967); Byrne v. Byrne, 398
S.W.2d 432, 434 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1965, no writ); McGowen v. McGowen, 273
S.W.2d 658, 659 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1954, writ dism'd); Du Pre v. Du Pre, 271
S.W.2d 829, 831 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1954, no writ); Price v. Price, 197 S.W.2d 200, 202
(Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1946, writ ref'd); Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n v. Birdwell, 39
S.W.2d 159, 160 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1931, writ ref'd); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 4.02,
12.04, 14.05(a),(d) (Vernon Supp. 1991). See generally Kazen, Support, in 3 FAMILY LAW TEXAS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 51.10[3] (Kazen ed. 1990); Note, Child Support - Parental Obligation to Support Adult Children Held Strictly Limited to CircumstancesEnumerated By Statute, 9 S. TEX. L.J. 101 (1966-67); supra note 6 and text accompanying notes 6 - 9.
Generally, when a child turns eighteen, a court's continuing jurisdiction over a child-related
order terminates. See generally Dorsaneo, Jurisdiction, Venue, and Transfers, in 2 FAMILY
LAW - TEXAS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 30.12 [5] (Kazen ed. 1989). Courts may order
one amount of child support for several minor children to continue until the youngest child
turns 18, see, e.g., Klise v. Klise, 678 S.W.2d 545, 546 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984,
no writ), thus, arguably, indirectly providing for the support of an adult child. See generally
Price, supra note 4, at E-32 to E-37.
24. See, e.g., Bohn v. Bohn, 455 S.W.2d 401, 415 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1970, writ dism'd); supra notes 12-20 and accompanying text. See generally Price, supra note
4, at E-8, E-22, E-38 to E-39. Courts may consider the needs of adult children in dividing
marital property. See, e.g., Young v. Young, 609 S.W.2d 759, 760 (Tex. 1980) (involving a
disabled child).
25. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 4.02, 14.05(a) (Vernon Supp. 1991). See generally
Kazen, Support, in 3 FAMILY LAW - TEXAS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 51.10[3] (Kazen
ed. 1989); Determinationof Support, in 4 TEXAS FAMILY LAW SERVICE § 27.10 (Speer 6th ed.
1988); 40 TEX. JUR. 3RD § 849-50 (1985 & Supp. 1990). The "educational exception" in Texas
authorizes support for adult children for purposes of facilitating graduation from high school.
See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 4.02 (general duty to support), 14.05(a) (periodic payment of
child support) (Vernon Supp. 1991). As originally drafted, section 14.05(a) was interpreted, as
was old section 14.05(b), as requiring the filing of a motion to seek adult support during high
school before the child turned 18 years old. See Sheldon v. Marshall, 768 S.W.2d 852, 854-55
(Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, no writ); Klaver v. Klaver, 764 S.W.2d 401, 402-03 (Tex. App.Fort Worth 1989, no writ); McLendon v. Allen, 752 S.W.2d 731, 733 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1988, no writ); Couser v. Stanton, 722 S.W.2d 250, 251 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
1986, no writ); Fullerton v. Holliman, 721 S.W.2d 478, 479 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1986, writ
dism'd); Ex parte Boemer, 711 S.W.2d 406, 407 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, original proceeding). See generally Sampson, Commentary on Title 2, Texas Family Code Symposium Supplement, 17 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1065, 1163 (1986); Price, supra note 4, at E-38 to E-39. For a
general discussion of a parent's duty to educate a child, see Children'sIssues, in 5 FAMILY
LAW - TEXAS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 113.02 (Kazen ed. 1989). The "disability exception" is the subject of this article.
26. See, e.g., Busbey v. Busbey, 619 S.W.2d 472, 475 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th
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Statutory Child-Support Payments

While Texas common law recognizes a parent's general duty to
support a child,2 7 it does not recognize a court's authority to require a
noncustodial parent to pay postdivorce child support to the custodial
parent. 28 However, in 1935, the Texas Legislature enacted now-repealed Revised Civil Statute Article 4639a.2 9 Under this statute,
Texas courts gained the authority to order one parent to pay
postdivorce child-support payments to the other parent. 30 This authority is currently in the Texas Family Code.31
3.

Statutory Support for Adult Disabled Children

a.

Article 4639a-1 (Repealed)

In 1961, the Texas Legislature enacted Revised Civil Statute Article 4639a-1 (now repealed), which authorized a court to order one
Dist.] 1981, no writ) (medical and educational expenses); Richey v. Bolerdack, 594 S.W.2d 795,
799 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1980, no writ); Stegall v. Stegall, 571 S.W.2d 564, 566 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Fort Worth 1978, no writ) (education expenses); Gray v. Bush, 430 S.W.2d 258, 263
(Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (college education); Snipes v. Snipes, 174
S.W.2d 741, 742 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1943, no writ). See generally Price, supra note 4, at
E-6 to E-10, E-33, E-64; Smith, Agreements Incident to Divorce, in 2 FAMILY LAW - TEXAS
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 44.02[5](c] (Kazen ed. 1989). A contract or agreement to support a child may be between the parents or a parent and a third party. Parents may agree or
contract to support a minor or adult child either by a contractual (consensual) divorce decree,
a contractual agreement incident to divorce which is incorporated into a divorce decree, or
otherwise. See, e.g., Busbey, 619 S.W.2d at 475; Richey, 594 S.W.2d at 799. Note, however,
that the Family Code requires that the terms of an agreement "set forth in the decree" may be
enforced by all remedies, "but are not enforceable as contract terms unless the agreement so
provides." TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.06(d) (Vernon 1986) (emphasis added). The Texas
Supreme Court has strictly construed this statute. See Elfeldt v. Elfeldt, 730 S.W.2d 657, 658
(Tex. 1987) (per curiam) (mere fact that decree is contractual is not enough; it must expressly
state that support provision is contractually enforceable); see also TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 14.0510) (Vernon Supp. 1991); Price, supra note 4, at E-64; supra text accompanying note 21
and infra text accompanying notes 207-09, 222-24.
27. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
28. See, e.g., Cunningham v. Cunningham, 120 Tex. 491, 501, 40 S.W.2d 46, 50 (1931);
Ex parte Gerrish, 42 Tex. Crim. 114, 57 S.W. 1123, 1124 (1900); see also Smith, Commentary
on Title 2, Texas Family Code Symposium, 5 TEX. TECH L. REV. 389, 429 (1974).
29. Act of March 19, 1935, ch 39, § 1, 1935 Tex. Gen. Laws 11l, repealedby Act of June
15, 1973, ch. 543, § 14.03, 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws 1411, 1424, 1458; Smith, supra note 28; see
also Ex parte Birkhead, 127 Tex. 556, 559-60, 95 S.W.2d 953, 954 (1936) (quoting new article
4639a in full).
30. Both articles 4639a, see supra note 29, and 4639a-1, see infra note 32, were repealed
by the adoption of Title Two of the Texas Family Code in 1973. See Act of June 15, 1973, ch.
543, § 14.03, 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws 1411, 1458.
31. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 14.05(a), (b), 14.051 (Vernon Supp. 1990).
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parent to pay postdivorce child support to the other parent for the
support of a disabled child, whether the child was a minor or an
adult.32 The statute required that the child: (1) be unmarried; (2) be
born of the marriage being dissolved; (3) require custodial care; (4) be
unable to adequately take care of or provide for himself; and (5) have
no personal estate or income sufficient to provide for his own care.3 3
The purpose of the statute was "to provide for the continued support
of children needing custodial care."' 34 Article 4639a-1 was expressly
applicable to any child, "whether a minor or not."' 35 The article was
permissive (discretionary) and not mandatory.36
b.

Original Family Code Subsection 14.05(b)

The Texas Legislature, in 1973, enacted Title Two of the Family
Code. 37 In doing so, it repealed article 4639a-1 but enacted an
amended version of the article as subsection (b) of new Family Code
section 14.05.38 The one-sentence subsection read as follows:
If the court finds that the child, whether institutionalized or not, requires continuous care and personal supervision because of a mental or
physical disability and will not be able to support himself, the court
may order the payments for the support of the child shall be continued
after the 18th birthday and extended for an indefinite period.3 9

32. See Act of Aug. 18, 1961, ch. 31, § 1, 1961 Tex. Gen. Laws 135, repealed by Act of
June 15, 1973, ch. 543, § 3, 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws 1411, 1424, 1458.
33. See id. Article 4639a-1 read in full as follows:
In addition to all other requirements, each petition for divorce shall further set out, if
such is a fact, that (1) an unmarried child, born of the marriage sought to be dissolved, is
physically or mentally unsound and requires custodial care, and (2) that such child cannot
adequately take care of or provide for himself, and (3) that such child has no personal
estate or income sufficient to provide for his reasonable and necessary care. If the Court
shall find all of such has been proven by full and satisfactory evidence the Court may
require and enforce support payments for such child, whether a minor or not, subject to
the power and authority of the Court to alter, change, suspend, or otherwise revise its
judgments as the facts and circumstances may require and in the manner required by law.
Id.; see also Byrne v. Byrne, 398 S.W.2d 432, 433-34 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1965, no writ)
(quoting article 4639a-1 in full).
34. Ex parte Hatch, 410 S.W.2d 773, 777 (Tex. 1967).
35. Act of Aug. 18, 1961, ch. 31, § 1, 1961 Tex. Gen. Laws 135 (repealed 1973).
36. See id. (court may require support payments); see also infra note 43.
37. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. tit. 2 (Vernon 1975), enacted by Act of June 15, 1973, ch.
543, § 1, 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws 1411 (effective January 1, 1974).
38. See Act of June 15, 1973, ch. 543, § 1, 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws 1411, 1424, amended by
Act of May 26, 1989, ch. 368, 1989 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 1457 (Vernon).
39. See id.
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This new subsection replaced the old "custodial" requirement for
postdivorce child support with a new standard requiring "continuous
care and personal supervision," whether or not the child was institutionalized.' As one commentator noted, "[a]lthough the tests for
support beyond age 18 were relaxed slightly by the 1973 Code, the
burden of proof demanded before child support may be extended for
an indefinite period past age 18 remains substantial."41 Subsection
14.05(b) was described as a "two-pronged test" requiring a finding
that the child (1) required continuous care and personal supervision
because of a mental or physical disability and (2) was not able to support himself.42 As with old article 4639a-1, even if the two-pronged
test was met, subsection 14.05(b) was still permissive and not
mandatory.43
In 1977, the Supreme Court of Texas, in Red v. Red,44 held that
relief sought under Family Code subsection 14.05(b) had to be "invoked" (e.g., a motion filed) before the child turned eighteen.4" Sub40. Compare id. with article 4639a-1, at supra note 32.
41. Sampson, Commentary on Title 2, Ch. 14, Texas Family Code Symposium, 13 TEX.
TECH L. REV. 927, 940-41 (1982).
42. See Attaway v. Attaway, 704 S.W.2d 492, 494 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, no
writ) (discussed infra note 50).
43. See Valaque v. Valaque, 574 S.W.2d 608, 609 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1978, no
writ); see also supra note 36.
44. 552 S.W.2d 90 (Tex. 1977).
45. Red v. Red, 552 S.W.2d 90, 92 (Tex. 1977), aff'g, 536 S.W.2d 431 (Tex. Civ. App.Houston [14th Dist.] 1976). In Red, a mother filed a motion to modify a prior support order
to obtain postmajority support for her disabled child. The motion was filed well past the child's
eighteenth birthday. The trial court dismissed the action for want of subject matter jurisdiction. Red, 552 S.W2d at 92. The appellate court affirmed, holding that once the child turned
eighteen, the trial court lost jurisdiction over the child. Red, 536 S.W.2d at 434. The dissenting opinion would have allowed the trial court to consider the mother's motion. Id. The
Supreme Court of Texas, in a 5-4 decision, affirmed, holding that once the child turned 18, the
trial court lost jurisdiction to modify the prior order. Red, 552 S.W.2d at 92. The court cited
Ex parteHatch, 410 S.W.2d 773 (Tex. 1967), as an analogous case, but emphasized that, while
old article 4639a-1 was available to a child "whether a minor or not," Family Code subsection
14.05(b) stated that a court may order that the payments for the support of a child shall "be
continued" after the child's 18th birthday. Id. Because of the phrase "be continued," as well
as the entire statutory scheme of the new Family Code, the Court held that subsection 14.05(b)
could not be applied after a child turned 18. Id. The majority cited Hatch, which overturned
the holding in Cuellar v. Cuellar, 406 S.W.2d 510 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1966, no
writ), which had allowed a modification order under then-new article 4639a-1 to require
postmajority support, even though the child was an adult when the suit was filed. Id. at 93.
The four-justice dissent in Red thought the majority had misconstrued Hatch and Cueller,
noting that those cases involved situations where no statutory duty existed when the child
reached 18 years of age. Id. at 95-99. The author of this article, after critiquing the statutes
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section 14.05(b) was amended in 1985 by adding a second sentence
that codified the Red decision and read as follows:
The court may enter an order under this subsection only if a request for
an order of extended support under this subsection has been made in

the original suit, a petition requesting further action under Section
11.07 of this code, or a motion to modify under Section 14.08 of this
code filed before the child's 18th birthday.46
Prior to the 1989 Texas Legislative Session, Family Code subsection 14.05(b) contained the two sentences quoted in the text above.
The first sentence recognized a disabled child's substantive right to
receive postmajority support and the concomitant substantive duty of
a parent to provide the support." The newer, second sentence was a
remedial or procedural limitation on the availability of this substantive right.48 In short, under old subsection 14.05(b), a court was authorized to enter an order requiring a parent to pay child support to
the other parent for an indefinite period of time for the support of a
disabled child during majority, but only if the petition or motion seeking the support was filed before the child turned eighteen. 49 Conand cases before Red, as well as the Red decision itself, believes the majority opinion in Red
was incorrect. See Price, supra note 4, at E-40 to E-44.
46. See Ch. 802, § 10, 1985 Tex. Gen. Laws 2841, 2844, repealedby Act of May 26, 1989,
71st Leg., R.S., ch. 368, § 1, 1989 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 1457 (Vernon). While this amendment
codified Red, it also had the effect of overturning a subsequently published opinion, tried
before the 1985 amendment, which held that the modification order itself had to be actually
signed before the child turned 18. See Attaway v. Attaway, 704 S.W.2d 492, 494-95 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi 1986, no writ).
47. See supra quote in text accompanying note 39.
48. See supra quote in text accompanying note 46. The second sentence of old Family
Code subsection 14.05(b) was merely a legal mechanism to, and limitation upon, the availability of the substantive right embodied in or conferred by the first sentence of the subsection.
See, e.g., Houtchens v. Matthews, 557 S.W.2d 581, 584 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1977,
writ dism'd) (remedial law "is the legal machinery by which the substantive law is made effective," quoting Harrison v. Cox, 524 S.W.2d 387, 391 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1975, writ
ref'd n.r.e.)); Du Pre v. Du Pre, 271 S.W.2d 829, 831 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1954, no writ).
49. Two appellate cases have upheld orders requiring postmajority support under old
Family Code subsection 14.05(b). See Rogers v. Stephens, 697 S.W.2d 75, 79 (Tex. App.Fort Worth 1985, writ dism'd); Rose v. Rubenstein, 693 S.W.2d 580, 582 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, writ dism'd). In neither of these cases was the timeliness of the filing of
the motion in issue. In Rowland v. Willy, 751 S.W.2d 725 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1988, original proceeding), the court held that where a mother's modification suit to provide
adult support for a retarded child was pending in the district court of continuing jurisdiction,
the mother's subsequent guardianship order issued by a probate court should be vacated. The
court stated that where the statutes confer jurisdiction on more than one court, deference must
be given to the court first acquiring jurisdiction.
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versely, once a disabled child turned eighteen, absent an existing order
or a pending suit under old subsection 14.05(b), a court lacked jurisdiction to order a parent to support the child. 50
c. Problems and Criticisms
Severe criticism of old Family Code subsection 14.05(b) arose.
Making the availability of postmajority support of a disabled child
turn upon the technicality of when a motion was filed seemed arbitrary and inequitable. The disabled child's statutory right to support
depended upon actions not only outside the child's control, but unrelated to the child's needs. If the parents of a disabled child divorced
while the child was a minor, a court could order postmajority support
for an indefinite period." On the other hand, if the same parents of
the same child waited to divorce until the child was eighteen years of
52
age or older, a court had no jurisdiction to order any child support.
50. Including the court of appeals opinion in Red, seven published appellate cases have
upheld orders denying, or have reversed or refused to enforce orders granting, postmajority
support under old subsection 14.05(b) See Red v. Red, 536 S.W.2d 431 (Tex. Civ. App.Houston [14th Dist.] 1976), aff'd, 552 S.W.2d 90, 92 (Tex. 1977); Harkins v. State, 773 S.W.2d
401, 404 (Tex App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, no writ) (corrected opinion) (modification
order entered after child turned 18, not enforceable, because court lacked jurisdiction to enter
the order); In Matter of Marriage of Burrell, 747 S.W.2d 479, 482-83 (Tex. App-Amarillo
1988, no writ); Attaway v. Attaway, 704 S.W.2d 492, 494-95 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
1986, no writ); Valaque v. Valaque, 574 S.W.2d 608, 609-10 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1978, no writ); Mial v. Mial, 543 S.W.2d 736, 738 (Tex. Civ. App.-E! Paso 1976, no writ); see
also Adkins v. Adkins, 743 S.W.2d 745, 746 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1987, writ denied) (prior
unpublished opinion expressly held motion to modify under old Family Code subsection
14.05(b), filed after child reached eighteen, was properly dismissed for want of subject matter
jurisdiction). All of these cases, except Valaque and Mial, turned on the fact that suit was not
timely filed. The Attaway case held that even though the motion was filed and the hearing was
held before the child turned eighteen, the order modifying was improperly signed after the
child turned eighteen. See Attaway, 904 S.W.2d at 494-95. The same court later admitted that
this holding went too far. See McLendon v. Allen, 752 S.W.2d 731, 732-33 (Tex. App.Corpus Christi 1988, no writ). In any event, the 1985 amendment to old subsection 14.05(b)
overturned Attaway (i.e., so long as motion filed before child turned 18, then court had jurisdiction to enter order under subsection). See supra note 46. A recent case, involving the
enforceability of a decree ordering a father to maintain life insurance on his life for the benefit
of the child until the child reached age 22, held that "[a] court of continuing jurisdiction has
no authority to order or to enforce support for a non-disabled child over eighteen." Lambourn
v. Lambourn, 787 S.W.2d 431, 432 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, writ denied).
51. See supra note 49.
52. See supra note 50. Associate Justice Pope, writing for the dissent in Red, stated the
problem as follows:
The majority holds that parents must hurry to the divorce court before a child reaches age
If a parent
18 because, absent an order before that age, there is nothing to continue ....
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Further, children diagnosed as having a mental or physical illness
which was only gradually disabling, such as multiple sclerosis, were
also subject to arbitiary and inequitable results. In such event, support under old subsection 14.05(b) was only available to the child
upon reaching majority if the child was already so disabled as to qualify for support under the subsection's substantive standards by need-

ing continuous care and personal supervision.13 On the other hand, if,
after adulthood, the child's disability finally met the substantive standards of subsection 14.05(b), relief would still be denied because of the

procedural limitation requiring that a petition or motion be filed
before the child turned eighteen.54 For these reasons, the procedural

limitation on the availability of the child's substantive right and the
corresponding parental duty with respect to support of a disabled
adult child was perceived as arbitrary, unreasonable, illogical, inequi-

table, and perhaps unconstitutional."

Legislative change was

amicably agrees to support a child until the child reaches age eighteen, as Mr. Red did,
and there is no prior support order which may be continued, the parent supplying the
support may stop and the court is left powerless to require future payments.
Red v. Red, 552 S.W.2d 90, 98 (Tex. 1977)(Pope, J., dissenting).
53. In Sininger v. Sininger, 479 A.2d 1354 (Md. 1984), the court thoroughly addressed
the dilemma caused by gradually disabling illnesses. The majority labeled as the "emancipation rationale" the appellant's (and the dissent's) contention that a duty of support is owed to a
disabled adult child who is disabled at the time of majority, but that the duty is not owed to a
child who becomes disabled after reaching majority. See id. at 1356. See generally supra notes
16-18 and infra note 133. The court then discussed the child's mental illness in this case:
Unlike physical injuries, mental disabilities often develop over time. The evidence in the
instant case traced the roots of Janette's mental disability into her childhood. Yet, her
mental difficulties, though present all along, did not become disabling.., until after she
passed the age of majority. Although she has suffered all along, her father is freed from
any obligation to support her because... her sufferings did not disable her until after her
twenty-first birthday.
Sininger, 479 A.2d at 1361.
54. As noted by Associate Justice Pope in the dissent in Red:
Children must develop their mental or physical disability before eighteen because if they
unfortunately develop the handicap at age nineteen, they do not qualify for help.
Red v. Red, 552 S.W.2d 90, 98 (Tex. 1977)(Pope, J., dissenting).
55. See, e.g., Kazen, Over-18 Disabled Child Adkins v. Adkins, 5 TEX. FAM. L. RPTR. No.
8 (March 1988) at 201. See generally Price, supra note 4, at E-45 to E-56 (raised question of
whether old subsection 14.05(b) violated U.S. and Texas Constitutions' equal protection
clauses and Texas Constitution's "open courts" provision). A challenge to old subsection
14.05(b) on equal protection grounds was raised in Rose v. Rubenstein, 693 S.W.2d 580, 583-84
(Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, writ dism'd). In Rose, only the father was ordered to
pay postmajority support under old subsection 14.05(b) when his mildly retarded son was a
minor. Id. at 583. His motion to decrease the amount of the support after his child passed
majority was denied. On appeal he contended, among other things, that the subsection deprived him of equal protection as applied to the situation. He argued that although the subsec-
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urged.56
II.

A.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

1987 Proposed Bill to Amend Family Code Subsection 14.05(b)

In 1987, legislation was introduced in the 70th Texas Legislature to
amend old Family Code subsection 14.05(b) to authorize support for
a disabled child regardless of when the disability arose. 57 This legislation failed to pass.58 Some felt that after a healthy child became an
adult, a postmajority disability should not re-impose upon an
unexpecting and unprepared parent a new legal duty to support an
adult handicapped child.59 Others feared that if the legislation was
not expressly limited to suits initiated by a parent, the new law might
open a floodgate of litigation stemming from public entities or agencies seeking financial support or reimbursement from parents for the
care which had been or was being provided to their disabled child.'
tion obligated him to support his adult child, it could not now be used to impose the same
obligation on the mother because: (1)the child was now an adult; and (2) no prior order
existed requiring the mother to pay support for the child. Id. Therefore, the mother could
escape her duty to support under old subsection 14.05(b). Id. at 583-84. Since the facts
showed that the mother was indeed contributing to the child's support, the court held that old
subsection 14.05(b) was not being applied against the father so as to currently deprive him of
equal protection. Id. at 584. The court found that "[n]o unconstitutional discrimination existed under the facts of this case." Id.
56. See Adkins v. Adkins, 743 S.W.2d 745, 747 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1987, writ denied);
HOUSE/SENATE JOINT INTERIM COMMITTEE ON CHILD SUPPORT, FINAL REPORT To THE
71ST LEGISLATURE, THEIR FUTURE Is IN OUR HANDS (1988) at 19 and Exhibit 7 (discussed

in detail infra note 63) [hereinafter 1988 INTERIM COMM. REPORT ON CHILD SUPPORT];
Kazen, Comment on Adkins v. Adkins, supra note 55, at 201. See generally Price, supra note 4.
57. See Tex. H.B. 1680, 70th Leg., R.S. (1987) (failed to pass).
58. Id. Representative Charlie Evans' H.B. 1680 was read for the first time and referred
to the House Judicial Affairs Committee on March 19, 1987. See H.J. OF TEX., 70th Leg.,
R.S. 604 (1987). As introduced, the bill would have allowed postmajority support at any time
if: (1) the child was older then 18; (2) the child required continuous care and personal supervision due to a mental disability; (3) the child was not able to support himself; (4) the child was
not institutionalized; (5) the parent requesting the order provided or paid for the child's care;
and (6) the order was in the child's best interest; however, only a parent could bring suit under
the proposed section. Id. Following a public hearing, a substitute version of the bill was
reported out favorably from the Committee. See id. at 1690, 3078. The new version did not
expressly limit suit to being brought only by a parent, but it did require that, to be eligible for
support under the bill, the child's disability must have been present when the child turned
eighteen. See Tex, C.S.H.B. 1680, 70th Leg., R.S. (1987).
59. Conversation between author and various legislators (1987).
60. See id.
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1989: House Bill 695 and Senate Bill 298

In 1988, the Council of the Family Law Section of the State Bar of
Texas drafted a proposed bill to rewrite the Family Code with respect
to the support of disabled children. 6 The State Bar Board of Directors approved this proposal without amendment as part of the State
Bar's official legislative package. 62 A joint interim legislative committee on child support also adopted this identical proposed bill as recommended legislation.63 This proposed legislation is attached to this
article as Appendix A.
The Texas Legislative Council then redrafted the Family Law
Council's proposed bill. 64 Representative Seidlits filed this redrafted
61. The author of this article, as a member of the Council, was assigned the task of preparing an initial draft for the Family Law Council to consider. With only two technical corrections, the Council approved the draft at its April 23, 1988 meeting in El Paso, Texas. The
Council made more extensive revisions to the amended draft at its June 18, 1988 meeting. This
draft bill was attached verbatim to an interim joint legislative committee's report. See infra
note 63, and app. A.
62. See Flores, State Bar of Texas BoardApproves 1989 Legislative Program, 51 TEX. B.J.
1132, 1132 (1988). Prior to this, the State Bar's Committee on State Legislation in the Public
Interest, of which the author was vice-chairman, had approved the Family Law Council's
proposed bill at its meeting on August 27, 1988. See infra app. A. See generally STATE BAR
OF TEXAS, PROPOSED LEGISLATION - 1989 LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM, STATE BAR OF TEXAS

(Aug. 1, 1988) at tab 20.
63. See 1988 INTERIM COMM. REPORT ON CHILD SUPPORT, supra note 56, at Exh. 7;
app. A. Regarding the need to amend the Family Code with respect to support for disabled
adult children, the Report stated:
Current Texas law allows the request for an extension of child support for children pursuing a high school diploma to be filed either before or after the child's 18th birthday.
However, for handicapped children, the request must be filed before the 18th birthday. It
would seem that the interests of the child and of the state would be better served if such
an extension were allowed to be filed within a reasonable time beyond the 18th birthday of
a handicapped child. This would allow the custodial parent and the court time to assess
the ongoing needs of the child. Legislation is needed to allow a request for an extension of
Child Support to be filed on behalf of mentally or physically handicapped children after
the child reaches 18 years of age.
Id. at 19. The Report then recommended the following legislative change:
Allow a request for an extension of child support to be filed on behalf of mentally or
physically handicapped children after the child reaches 18. (Exhibit 7, Family Law Bill).
Id. at 32. The Committee's proposed legislation, attached to the Report as Exhibit 7, was
identical to the State Bar's Family Law Council's originally proposed version. The State Bar
Board subsequently adopted it as part of the Bar's official legislative package. See supra notes
61-62.
64. This redrafting was not intended to effect any substantive change in the proposed bill,
although, as sometimes happens, some substantive changes did inadvertently occur. This Legislative Council's version was introduced as H.B. 695 and S.B. 298. See supra note 62; infra
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bill as House Bill 695 on January 26, 198965 while Senator Caperton
filed it as Senate Bill 298 on January 30, 1989.66 A copy of S.B. 298 as
originally filed (i.e., the Texas Legislative Council's draft) is attached
to this article as Appendix B.6 7
At a hearing on S.B. 298 on March 21, Senator Caperton laid out a
Senate Committee Substitute for S.B. 298 (referred to, in the Senate,
as C.S.S.B. 298) which contained a number of amendments to original
S.B. 298.68 There was only very short public testimony, all in support
of C.S.S.B. 298, at the March 21 hearing. 69 The Senate Jurisprudence
Committee then voted the substitute bill out favorably without
amendment or dissenting vote on March 22 and placed it on the Senate's local and consent calendar on March 30, 1989.70 There was no
Senate floor debate on C.S.S.B. 298 and it passed the Senate on March
30, 1989. 7'
app. B (copy of S.B. 298 as originally introduced) and app. A (Family Law Council's proposed
bill).
65. See Tex. H.B. 695, 71st Leg. (1989); see also infra app. B (copy of S.B. 298). House
Bill 695 was read in the House for the first time and referred to the House Committee on
Judicial Affairs on February 16, 1989. See H.J. OF TEX., 71st Leg., R.S. 305 (1989). It was
considered in public hearing in the committee and referred to a subcommittee on March 8,
1989. There was only very brief public testimony, all in support of H.B. 695, at the March 8
hearing. A copy of the tape from this hearing is available from the Texas House Hearing
Reporter. Also, a bill analysis of H.B. 695 is available from the Senate Jurisprudence Committee's office in Austin, Texas. Since S.B. 298 passed the Senate and was referred to the House
Judicial Affairs Committee before H.B. 695 ever got out of that Committee, H.B. 695 was
simply abandoned (left in subcommittee) and S.B. 298 became the vehicle for enacting the law.
See infra notes 66-81 and accompanying text.
66. See Tex. S.B. 298, 71st Leg. (1989); infra app. B (copy of S.B. 298). S.B. 298 and
H.B. 695 were companion (identical) bills filed virtually simultaneously in both the House and
Senate. S.B. 298 was introduced and read in the Senate for the first time, and was referred to
the Senate Committee on Jurisprudence, on January 31, 1989. See S.J. OF TEX., 71st Leg.,
R.S. 164 (1989).
67. Appendix B is the Texas Legislative Council's redraft of the Family Law Council's
original draft (app. A) and was introduced as companion bills, H.B. 695 and S.B. 298. See
supra notes 61-66 and accompanying text.
68. See Comm. Substitute Tex. S.B. 298, 71st Leg. (1989) (available from Senate Jurisprudence Comittee in Austin, Texas). This is the bill which finally passed, without amendment,
and was signed into law. See infra notes 69-82 and accompanying text.
69. A copy of the tape from this hearing is available from the Texas Senate Staff Services
Office. Also, a bill analysis of S.B. 298 as originally introduced, and a bill analysis of C.S.S.B.
298, are available from the Senate Jurisprudence Committee's office in Austin, Texas.
70. See S.J. OF TEX., 71st Leg., R.S. 549, 551 (1989). A bill analysis of C.S.S.B. 298 is
available. See supra note 69.
71. See S.J. oF TEX., 71st Leg., R.S. 549, 551 (1989). Bills placed on (and not subsequently removed from) the Local and Consent Calendar of either house are not even brought
up for formal consideration or vote on the floor of that house. The Senate Journal indicates a
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Senate Bill 298 was then referred to the House.7 2 A hearing before

the House Judicial Affairs Committee was held on S.B. 298 on May 3,
1989. 73 Senate Bill 298 was reported out favorably, without amendment or dissenting vote, from the House committee on May 10,
1989. 74 On May 25, 1989, S.B. 298 was laid out for second reading on
the House floor. 7" Besides Representative Seidlits' brief introductory
remarks, there was no House floor debate on S.B. 298 and it passed
without amendment to third reading by a nonrecord vote on May 25,
1989.76 Finally, on May 26, 1989, S.B. 298 was laid out for third and
final reading before the House. 77 Again, Representative Seidlits made
some cursory remarks in laying out the bill, but there was no House
floor debate. At 6:40 p.m. on May 26, 1989, S.B. 298 finally passed
the House without amendment by a nonrecord vote. 78 Thus, Senate
Committee Substitute S.B. 29871 was the bill which finally passed both
houses without one dissenting vote or amendment and was sent to the

Governor. s°

final "vote" of 30 yeas and 0 nays on C.S.S.B. 298, as it did for virtually all bills on the Senate
Local and Consent Calendar for that day, although no real vote was taken. Id.; Act of May
26, 1989, ch. 368, 1989 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 1457, 1458 (Vernon) (codified as an amendment
to TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 14.05(b) and 14.051).
72. See H.J. OF TEX., 71st Leg., R.S. 779, 833 (1989) (Senate received S.B. 298 from
House on March 30, 1989 and referred to House Committee on Judicial Affairs on April 5,
1989). Representative Seidlits, author of companion H.B. 695, sponsored S.B. 298 in the
House.
73. A copy of the tape from this hearing is available from the House Committee Coordinator's office in Austin, Texas. Also, a bill analysis of S.B. 298 is available from the House
Judicial Affairs Committee's office in Austin, Texas.
74. See H.J. OF TEX., 71st Leg., R.S. 1648, 1649 (1989).
75. See id. at 2533. A bill analysis of S.B. 298, prepared for House members, is available
from the Legislative Council's House Bill Distribution office in Austin, Texas. Also, the
House Study Group, funded by various House members, prepared detailed analyses on all bills
reaching the House floor and prepared an analysis on S.B. 298, which is available from the
Group's office in Austin, Texas.
76. See id. A copy of the tape of the action on the House floor is available from the
House Committee Coordinator's office in Austin, Texas.
77. See id. at 2714.
78. See id.; see also Act of May 26, 1989, ch. 368, 1989 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 1457, 1458
(Vernon) (codified as an amendment to TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 14.05(b) and 14.051). The
time was recorded by the author, who was present in the House gallery when the bill passed on
third reading.
79. See supra note 68.
80. Tex. S.B. 298, after passing its third and final reading in the House on May 26, 1989,
was reported to the Senate as passed on May 27, was signed in the Senate and the House on
May 28, and was sent to the Governor on May 29, 1989. See H.J. OF TEX., 71st Leg., R.S.
3169 (1989); S.J. OF TEX., 71st Leg., R.S. 3608, 3661 (1989).
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Governor Clements approved and signed S.B. 298 into law on June
14, 1989.81 The new law went into effect on September 1, 1989.82

The short bill analyses, the very brief testimony in committee hearings, and the introductory remarks on the House floor all serve as
legislative history.8" However, a comparison of S.B. 298 as it was

originally introduced with Senate Committee Substitute S.B. 298 as it
was finally passed and signed into law, provides the clearest legislative

history behind certain provisions of the law.84
III.
A.

ANALYSIS OF NEW LEGISLATION

Overview of Major Changes
Senate Bill 298 amended Texas Family Code subsection 14.05(b) by

repealing the existing two-sentence subsection and adding a new sentence which merely references new subsection 14.051.85 Senate Bill

298 also enacted new section 14.051, entitled "Support for a Minor or

Adult Disabled Child."8 6 Section 14.051 authorizes a court to order

indefinite child support for a disabled minor or adult child, regardless
of the age of the child when suit is brought, so long as the child's
disability exists, or the cause of the disability is known to exist, before

the child turns eighteen years old.8 7

There are at least six major elements to the legislation. First, the
substantive standardsunder old Family Code subsection 14.05(b) are

kept virtually intact in new section 14.051.88 Second, and most importantly, the availability of postmajority support is no longer contin-

gent upon when a parent seeks the relief but depends, instead, upon

when the child's disability arises.8 9 Thus, the relief of indefinite sup81. See Act of May 26, 1989, ch. 368, 1989 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 1457, 1458 (Vernon)
(codified as an amendment to Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §§ 14.05(b) and 14.051).
82. See id. § 3, at 1458; infra text accompanying note 228.
83. See supra notes 64-78 and accompanying text.
84. Compare infra app. B with TEX FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 14.05(b) and 14.051 (Vernon
Supp. 1991); see also supra notes 57-60 and accompanying text (proposed 1987 legislation), 6163 and accompanying text and app. A (Family Law Council's draft bill), and 64-78 and accompanying text (legislative history of S.B. 298).
85. See Act of May 26, 1989, ch. 368, § 1, 1989 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 1457 (Vernon)
(codified as an amendment to Tex. Fain. Code Ann. § 14.05(b)).
86. See id. § 2.
87. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.051 (Vernon Supp. 1991).

88. See id. § 14.051(b)(1); infra notes 100-01 and accompanying text, 118-27 and accompanying text.
89. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.051(b)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1991); infra notes 100-07
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port is available at any time, regardless of the age of the child, if the
child is disabled, or if the cause of the disability is known to exist,
before the child reaches majority. Third, with one exception, only a
parent may sue under section 14.051, and public and private entities
or agencies are expressly prohibited from bringing or maintaining suit
under the section. 90 Fourth, the emphasis throughout section 14.051
lies on both parents sharing a disabled child's postmajority costs and
expenses. 9 ' Fifth, an order for postmajority support may be requested
and entered either while the child is still a minor or after the child is
an adult. 92 Sixth, different Family Code provisions determine the
amount of support depending upon the age of the child at the time
when the support is to be paid. 93 The amount of support paid for the
disabled child during minority is generally determined pursuant to the
standard child-support guidelines applicable to all children, while the
amount of support paid during adulthood is determined pursuant to
subsection 14.051(g).
B.

Subsection-By-Subsection Analysis

The following is a subsection-by-subsection analysis of the new legislation. Each subsection of the Texas Family Code that is analyzed is
quoted verbatim in bold print below, followed by an analysis of the
subsection.
1. Subsection 14.05(b)
The court may order either or both parents to provide for the support of
a minor or adult disabled child for an indefinite period under Section
14.051 of this code.
The two sentences of old Family Code subsection 14.05(b) were
repealed and replaced with one new sentence which merely references
new section 14.051. 94 Importantly, this subsection, along with suband accompanying text, 128-37 and accompanying text; see also TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 14.051(d) (Vernon Supp. 1991); infra notes 147-49 and accompanying text.
90. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.051(c) (Vernon Supp. 1991); infra notes 108, 138-46
and accompanying text.
91. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 14.05(b), 14.051(b),(g),(h) (Vernon Supp. 1991).

92. See id. §§ 14.05(b), 14.051(a),(b),(d),(f).
93. See id. §§ 14.05(b), 14.051(a),(b),(g).
94. Id. § 14.05(b). Old subsection 14.05(b) was, of course, preceded by now-repealed
article 4639a-1. See supra notes 32-33. The two sentences of old subsection 14.05(b), quoted

in the text accompanying supra notes 39 and 46, were repealed by S.B. 298. See Act of May
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section 14.051(b), expressly grants courts the authority to order support for disabled children of any age, and highlights that indefinite
support may be awarded whether or not the child is still a minor. 9" In
effect, old subsection 14.05(b) has been replaced with new subsection
14.051.
2.

Subsection 14.051(a)

In this section: (1) "Adult child" means a child who is 18 years of age or
older. (2) "Child" means a son or daughter of any age.
Family Code subsection 14.051(a) defines "adult child" and
"child" as those terms are used in the section. Contrary to Family
Code section 11.01(1), the term "child," as defined in subsection
14.05 1(a), is not limited to minors but refers to a son or daughter "of
any age." 9 6 The term "adult child" is limited to a child who is eigh-

26, 1989, ch. 368, § 1, 1989 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 1457 (Vernon). The initial portion of the new
sentence composing subsection 14.05(b) is based on the similar introduction language of subsection 14.05(a), and is similar to the initial language in new subsection 14.051(b). The sentence appeared virtually verbatim in all draft versions of the legislation. See supra notes 61-80
and accompanying text and infra apps. A and B. New subsection 14.05(b), like both its predecessor statute, and subsection 14.051(b), is permissive and not mandatory. See supra text accompanying notes 36, 43 and infra text accompanying notes 102-03. It also addresses the fact
that "both" parents may be required to pay support, as do subsections 14.051(b),(g),(h). See
supra text accompanying note 91 and infra notes 110, 163, and text accompanying notes 100,
163, 168, 173, 179, 181.
95. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 14.05(b), 14.051(b) (Vernon Supp. 1991).
96. Compare id. § 11.01(1) with id. § 14.051(a)(2). The age of majority was 21 years of
age at common law, but is generally eighteen in Texas, with certain statutory exceptions regarding, inter alia, the duty to pay child support until the child graduates from high school.
See supra notes 6, 12-14, 23 and accompanying text. Now-repealed article 4639a-1 did not
expressly define child or adult, but authorized support for any disabled child, whether a minor
or an adult. See supra note 33 and text accompanying notes 32-36. Likewise, old subsection
14.05(b) did not define child or adult child, but did authorize support for any minor disabled
child to continue into adulthood if suit for such relief was invoked before age eighteen. See
supra notes 45-46, 48-50 and text accompanying notes 39, 45-50. The 1987 proposed legislation originally addressed a child older than eighteen years, then was amended to reference an
"adult son or daughter." See supra note 57-60 and accompanying text. All versions of the
Family Law Council's draft of the new legislation contained merely the definition of "child,"
which was defined to mean a minor or an adult child of the parents. See supra notes 61-63 and
accompanying text and infra app. A. The two definitions in the final bill were initially inserted
by the Legislative Council's version, see infra app. B, and appeared unchanged in S.B. 298 as
originally introduced and as substituted in committee and signed into law. See supra notes 6480 and accompanying text. The definitions serve as the foundation for one of the key elements
in the legislation, this being to make the remedy available despite the age of the child so long as
the substantive standards are otherwise met. See supra text accompanying note 92.
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teen years of age or older.9 7 The only subsection of new section

14.051 in which the term "adult child" is used is subsection (g), which
is used to determine the amount and terms of support to be paid during a disabled child's adulthood. 9 These specific definitions apparently supersede any conflicting definition of "child" contained

elsewhere in the Code.99
3.

Subsection 14.051(b)

The court may order either or both parents to provide for the support of
the child for an indefinite period and determine the rights, privileges,

duties, and powers of the child's parents for the support of the child if
the court finds that: (1) the child, whether institutionalized or not, requires substantial care and personal supervision because of a mental or

physical disability and will not be able to support himself; and (2) the
disability exists, or the cause of the disability is known to exist, before
or on the 18th birthday of the child. °'
97. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.051(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1991).
98. See id. § 14.051(a)(1), (g).
99. See, e.g., id. § 11.01(1) (general definitions). Section 11.01 contains general definitions to be used throughout Subtitle A of Title Two of the Family Code, which would include
section 14.05 1. The definitions under section 11.01 apply "unless the context requires a different definition: .... " Id. § 11.01. The terms "child" and "minor" are defined simultaneously
under subdivision (1) of section 11.01 to mean "a person under eighteen years of age who is not
and has not been married and who has not had his disabilities removed for general purposes,"
while "adult" is defined under subdivision (1) as "any other person." Id. § I 1.01(1). The only
portion of section 11.01(l) expressly in conflict with the definitions under subsection 14.05 l(a)
is the phrase "under eighteen years of age." Thus, "unless the context" of the use of the term
"child" under section 14.051 "requires a different definition," section 14.051 would not be
available to a minor or adult disabled child who is or ever has been married or had his disabilities removed for general purposes. Id. Other provisions of the Code which do not contain
definitions would apply equally to section 14.051 unless expressly superseded by a specific
provision of section 14.051. In this respect, section 14.05(d) provides that, absent agreement
or order to the contrary, support provisions terminate upon the marriage of the child, the
removal of the child's disabilities, or the death of the obligor. Id. § 14.05(d) (Vernon 1986).
Now repealed article 4639a-1 applied only to a child who was "unmarried." See supra note 33
and accompanying text. No case under article 4639a-1 addressed whether "unmarried" meant
only presently unmarried at the time of the order or included a child who had been married but
was now divorced. However, under the Family Code, if a child has been married and divorced
during minority, the "child" has now become an adult, see TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.01(1)
(Vernon Supp. 1991), and, absent agreement or decree to the contrary, this terminates any
child-support order with respect to that child. Id. § 14.05(d). However, if the child's marriage
is annulled, then the marriage was void ab initio and the child-support obligation continues.
Fernandez v. Fernandez, 717 S.W.2d 781 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1986, writ dism'd). For a
discussion of the definition of "parent," see infra note 109.
100. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.051(b) (Vernon Supp. 1991). As noted, at commonlaw, a parent had a legal duty to support an adult disabled child, but only if the disability
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Subsection 14.05 1(b) establishes the section's substantive standards
and the court's authority to enter an order under Family Code section
14.051."' This is the heart of the new legislation.
The fact that the court "may" order support under the subsection
indicates that new Family Code section 14.051 is, like its predecessors, permissive and not mandatory. 02 Thus, even if the substantive
standards under subsection 14.051(b) are met, the court still has
existed at the time of majority. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text. New subsection
14.051(b) is, in essence, an adoption of this rule.
101. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.05(b) (Vernon Supp. 1991). As with new subsection
14.05(b), subsection 14.051(b) expressly grants a trial court the authority to order support
under the section. The substantive standards are set out in subdivisions (1) and (2). Subdivision (1) is virtually identical to language in now-repealed article 4639a-1 and to the first sentence of old Family Code subsection 14.05(b). See supra note 33 and text accompanying note
39. Both drafts of the 1987 proposed legislation contained language similar to subdivision (1).
See supra note 58 and text accompanying notes 57-60. Language similar to subdivision (2),
which codifies a limitation recognized at common law, was first inserted in the second draft of
the 1987 proposed bill. See supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text. The Family Law Council's drafts of subsection (b) contained language which was virtually identical to the present
subsection 14.051(b) and, for emphasis, also re-stated in the negative what subdivision (2)
states in the positive (i.e. "[a]n order may not be entered under this section if the disability first
arose after the time the child attained eighteen years of age;... "). See supra notes 61-63 and
accompanying text and infra app. A. The Legislative Council's version shortened the Family
Law Council's draft, primarily by shortening the provision and setting out more succinctly the
two distinct tests now contained in subdivisions (1) and (2). See supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text and infra app. B. The problem, however, was that the Legislative Council's version also inadvertently changed some important language contained in the Family Law
Council's draft. First of all, the Legislative Council's draft merely began with the phrase, "[a]
court may order the support of a child ....
See infra app. B. Unlike the Family Law
Council's version, this did not conform with the present wording in Code subsection 14.05(a)
or proposed new subsection 14.05(b) (i.e. "court may order either or both parents"), and did
not expressly state that only a "parent" could be ordered to pay support under this subsection.
See infra app. A. Second, the Family Law Council felt that sentence one of old subsection
14.05(b) should be used virtually verbatim in the new bill to reduce unnecessary litigation over
the inadvertent use of different words and to take advantage of the relatively good case law
developed under old subsection 14.05(b). Therefore, with one exception, the Family Law
Council's draft adopted the first sentence of old subsection 14.05(b) into new subsection
14.05 1(b). See supra notes 61-62 and infra app. A. However, the Legislative Council's version
totally rearranged the wording in its draft of subdivision (1) of subsection 14.05 1(b). See supra
note 64 and infra app. B. The Committee Substitute for S.B. 298 redrafted subdivision (1) of
subsection 14.05 1(b) to conform with the Family Law Council's draft and, therefore, with one
exception, comported with prior law. See supra notes 39 & 68 and accompanying text. This
subsection supports several of the key elements of the legislation, e.g., to maintain the substantive standard of old subsection 14.05(b), to make the availability of the section dependent on
when the child's disability arose rather than when the motion was filed, and to highlight that
both parents have a duty to support adult disabled children. See supra text accompanying
notes 88-89, 91.
102. See supra notes 36, 43 and accompanying text.
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broad discretion to enter an order under the section.
Note that old Family Code subsection 14.05(b) authorized a court
to order payments to "be continued" after the child's eighteenth
birthday."°4 The Texas Supreme Court held that the phrase "be continued" implied the existence of a valid order and, therefore, a motion
under old subsection 14.05(b) had to be filed before the child turned
eighteen.105 This phrase has been completely deleted. The new language under subsection 14.05 1(b), allowing a court to "order" parents
to support a disabled child, is broader in scope. 0 6 A court now may
enter any type of order under new section 14.051, including a new
07
order or an order which continues or modifies an existing order.
The court may also order either or both "parents" to provide support under Family Code section 14.051.108 Under another Family
Code section, the term "parent" means the mother, a man as to whom
the child is legitimate or a man whom a court has adjudicated to be
the biological father, or an adopted mother or father, but does not
include a parent as to whom the parent-child relationship has been
terminated. °9 Subsection (b) is the first of several subsections of section 14.051 to reference the fact that "both" of the parents may be

103. See supra notes 36, 43 and accompanying text. As usual, the best-interest-of-thechild standard applies to suits under section 14.051. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.07(a)
(Vernon 1986).
104. See supra note 38 and text accompanying note 39.
105. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
106. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.051(b) (Vernon Supp. 1991); see also id. § 14.05(a),
(b).
107. See id. § 14.051(b); see also id. § 14.051(e),(f),(h),(i).
108. See id. § 14.051(b). The word "parent," included in the Family Law Council's
draft, see infra app. A, but deleted from the Legislative Council's draft, see infra app. B, was
inserted in the Committee Substitute for S.B. 298. See supra note 68. This conforms with the
general rule that only a parent has a legal duty to support a child. See supra note 5 and
accompanying text. It also comports with subsection 14.051(c), which states that only a parent may bring suit under section 14.051 (with one exception). See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 14.05(a) (Vernon Supp. 1991).
109. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.01(3) (Vernon Supp. 1991). The general definitions
under section 11.01 apply throughout the Code unless the context of the use of a defined term
elsewhere requires a different definition. Id. § 11.01. While now-repealed article 4639a-1 expressly applied only to natural children born of the marriage of the parents, see supra note 33,
support obligations under the Family Code, including those under section 14.051, apply to any
natural or adopted child. See id. § 11.01(3); see also id. § 16.09(a), (c). A parent whose parental rights are terminated owes no duty to support their biological or adopted child with respect
to whom the relationship was terminated. Id. §§ 11.01 (3), 15.07. For a discussion of the
definition of "child," see supra note 99.
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As with old Family Code subsection 14.05(b), support under new
section 14.051 may be for an "indefinite period." ' Thus, postmajority support may continue for as long as a court determines the
support is in the best interest of the child." 2
A court also is given the authority under Family Code subsection
14.051(b) to "determine the rights, privileges, duties, and powers of
the child's parents for the support of the child .

. . ."

Thus, a

court's authority is greater than merely requiring the noncustodial
parent to make periodic monetary payments to the custodial parent.
In Rose v. Rubenstein,11 4 an argument was made that while a court
had authority under old subsection 14.05(b) to require the noncustodial parent to pay periodic child support to the custodial parent, the
court had no authority to enter any other orders regarding the child
or the custodial parent once the child turned eighteen." 5 Subsection
14.051(b) clearly states that a court may enter orders with respect to
all of the "rights, privileges, duties and powers" of "either or both"
parents, but only with respect to the "support" of the child.11 6 This
provision does not open the door to postmajority custodial or possession orders except as they may directly bear upon the support neces110. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 14.05(b), 14.051(b),(g),(h) (Vernon Supp. 1991) (all
reference obligation of "both parents" to support a child); see also id. § 14.05(a). As noted,
this shared obligation was one of the key elements of the new legislation. See supra text accompanying note 91. This conforms with the general rule that both parents have an equal
duty to support a child, as limited only by their respective abilities to do so. See supra note 5.
111. Compare TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.051(b) (Vernon Supp. 1991) with supra text
accompanying notes 33, 39, 94, 100.
112. See, e.g., Rogers v. Stephens, 697 S.W.2d 75, 77, 79 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1985,
writ dism'd) (support ordered for 3 years past child's eighteenth birthday); Rose v. Rubenstein,
693 S.W.2d 580, 583 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, writ dism'd) (apparently, indefinite support past age eighteen was ordered).
113. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.051(b),(g),(h) (Vernon Supp. 1991).
114. 693 S.W.2d 580, 583 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, writ dism'd).
115. Id. For a discussion of this point, see supra note 55 and accompanying text.
116. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.05(b) (Vernon Supp. 1991). The phrase "rights, privileges, duties and powers" conforms with other Family Code sections, see id. § 12.04, and appears several times within section 14.051. See id. § 14.051(b),(g),(h). The phrase as used
throughout section 14.051, however, is always modified by the phrase "for the support of the
child" (emphasis added). The initial draft of the Family Law Council's proposed bill referred
to orders for the "support, care and supervision" of the child. See supra note 61 and accompanying text and infra app. A. To defuse concerns by Council members that this wording might
authorize courts to enter postmajority custody and possession orders, the words "care and
supervision" were deleted from the Council's final draft. See infra app. A. Thus, the language
"for the support" of the child limits courts to orders governing only the support of the child.
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sary for the care and supervision of the child. 1 7

Subdivisions (1) and (2) of Family Code subsection 14.051(b) provide, respectively, the substantive test for, and the limitations upon,

the availability of support under Family Code section 14.051.118 Subdivision (1), with one exception, incorporates verbatim the substantive
test contained in old subsection 14.05(b)." 9 Whereas old subsection
14.05(b) required a need for "continuous" care, new subsection
14.05 1(b)(1) requires a need for "substantial" care. 2 0 As noted, nowrepealed article 4639a- 1 required "custodial" care, but this require-

ment was strictly construed and arguably led to harsh results. 12' In
enacting original subsection 14.05(b), the word "custodial" was de-

leted and substituted with the word "continuous."'' 22 However, the
word "continuous" under old subsection 14.05(b) also was susceptible
to strict construction.' 2 Therefore, the word "continuous" has now
117. A court is clearly not limited to merely ordering one parent to pay to the other
parent periodic child support, as is standard under normal child-support circumstances. For
example, a court might enter orders directing one parent to pay all or a portion of a certain
monthly financial amount to the other parent and/or to a third party. See infra notes 145-46
and accompanying text. A parent may be required to turn over certain property or assets to
the other parent or third parties. Each parent may be ordered to carry certain health insurance for the child or life insurance on their life for the benefit of the child or to reimburse each
other for payments made directly to third parties for the support of the child. The court could
monitor private or public assistance being provided for the child's benefit.
118. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.051(b)(1), (2) (Vernon Supp. 1991).
119. See id. § 14.051(b)(1); cf. supra text accompanying note 39.
120. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.05(b)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1991); supra text accompanying note 39.
121. See supra notes 40-41, 51-56 and accompanying text. In Byrne v. Byrne, 398 S.W.2d
432, 434 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1965, no writ), the court upheld the trial court's denial of
a request for postmajority support under now-repealed article 4639a-1. The court stated that
while the child had no personal estate or income sufficient to provide for his care, the child was
not so physically or mentally unsound as to require custodial care or to be unable to provide or
care for himself. Id. InAversa v. Aversa, 405 S.W.2d 157, 160 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio),
writ dism'd w.o.j per curiam, 407 S.W.2d 769 (Tex. 1966), the court reversed the trial court's
order for postmajority support because the evidence did not show that the child required "custodial care." The court noted that the requirements under article 4639a-1 of "custodial care"
and "no personal estate or income" referred to special care called for by the child's illness. Id.
at 159. See generally Note, Child Support - ParentalObligation to Support Adult Children Held
Strictly Limited to CircumstancesEnumerated by Statute, 9 S.TEX. L.J. 101 (1966-67) (case
note on Aversa v. Aversa).
122. See supra note 33 and text accompanying notes 39-40.
123. In Mial v. Mial, 543 S.W.2d 736, 738 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1976, no writ), the
court upheld the trial court's order for support only during minority, noting that the trial
court did not find the need for continuous care and personal supervision or the children's
inability to support themselves. In Rose v. Rubenstein, 693 S.W.2d 580, 583 (Tex. App.Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, writ dism'd), the court defined "continuous care and supervision"
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been replaced with the word "substantial" in new subsection
14.051(b). 124

While

this

somewhat relaxes

the standard

for

postmajority support, the standard is still stringent, because before
postmajority support is available, a child still must require "substantial care," "personal supervision," and "not be able to support himself." ' 25 To counterbalance the slight lessening of the substantive test,
subsection 14.051(g) directs a court to determine the amount of
postmajority support by focusing upon the degree of care and supervision directly related to the child's disabilities.' 26 Thus, with but one
amendment, the same two-prong test provided under old subsection
14.05(b) still exists under new subsection 14.051(b)(1): a court may
only order postmajority child support if the child (1) requires substantial care and personal supervision because of his disability; and (2) is
127
unable to support himself.

Subdivision (2) of Family Code subsection 14.051(b) limits the applicability of section 14.051 to a child whose disability already exists,
or the cause of that "disability is known to exist, before or on" the
child's eighteenth birthday. 2 Thus, the limitation on the availability
of postmajority support for a disabled child under section 14.051 depends upon when the disability arises and not, as under old subsection
14.05(b), upon when a petition or motion is filed. 129 This procedural
change was the primary purpose for enacting S.B. 298.130 Old subsection 14.05(b) was highly criticized because a disabled child's right to
postmajority support was arbitrarily contingent upon when the petition or motion seeking the relief was filed. 13 Nevertheless, the Texas
legislature seemingly was not amenable to imposing on a parent an
as meaning an uninterrupted extension in time or sequence, a continuance without intermission, or a regular recurrence after minute interruption. See Attaway v. Attaway, 704 S.W.2d
492, 494 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, no writ) (14.05(b) requirement not met merely
because child failed to complete high school due solely to lack of his own application).
124. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.051(b) (Vernon Supp. 1991). The word "substantial"
appeared in the Family Law Council's draft of the legislation and in the original draft of S.B.
298. See infra apps. A and B. As originally drafted, Senate Committee Substitute for S.B. 298
contained the word "continuous," but this was substituted in committee hearing by handwritten insertion on the bill with the word "substantial." See supra note 68.
125. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.051(b)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1991).
126. See id. § 14.051(g).
127. See id. § 14.051(b)(1); supra text accompanying note 42.
128. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.051(b)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1991).
129. See supra notes 46, 48-50, 89 and accompanying text.
130. See supra notes 51-56 and accompanying text.

131. See supra notes 51-56 and accompanying text.
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unexpected duty of support for a child who first becomes disabled

after reaching majority.132 Thus, new subsection 14.051(b)(2) addresses both concerns by codifying the common-law rule that
postmajority support may be ordered if the child's disability arises
33
before reaching majority, but not if it arises thereafter.
Under new subdivision (2) of subsection 14.051(b), a court has au-

thority to enter an order only if (1) the disability in fact exists prior to
age eighteen or (2) the cause of the disability is known to exist before

the child turns eighteen.' 34 The phrase "cause of the disability is
known to exist" is intended to cover situations where a child's mental
or physical illness, at the time the child reaches majority, is known
but is not yet so disabling as to qualify under the substantive test set

out in subdivision (1) of subsection 14.051(b).1 33 For example, if a
child has been diagnosed as having multiple sclerosis, the child, upon
reaching majority, may not yet be so disabled as to require "substan-

tial care and personal supervision" or as to "not be able to support
132. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
133. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.051(b)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1991). The common-law
rule that postmajority support is only available if the disability existed before majority, as
discussed at supra notes 16-18, 53 and accompanying text, and as incorporated in new subsection 14.051(b)(2), is not without its critics. See, e.g., Sininger v. Sininger., 479 A.2d 1354, 1360
(Md. 1984). Labeling the common-law rule the "emancipation rationale," the court stated:
We could easily imagine a hypothetical that would have absurd results under an emancipation rationale approach. For instance, a man's two daughters, one age seventeen, the
other age eighteen, are injured and paralyzed in the same car accident. The younger
daughter can rely on her father's support indefinitely, yet the eighteen-year-old daughter
has no right to support. We reject the inequitable results that could follow from the
appellant's [emancipation rationale] approach.
Id. In support of the common-law rule, some feel that there should be some point in time in
which a parent may determine with some degree of certainty his or her future financial obligations with respect to a child. See generally supra text accompanying note 59. Arguably,
society as a whole should bear the financial support of disabled adult citizens and not the adult
child's aging parent or parents. In few areas does society hold parents legally liable or responsible for their adult children.
134. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.051(b)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1991). A similar provision existed in the second draft of the 1987 legislation. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text. This language appeared in all drafts of S.B. 298. See supra notes 61-81 and
accompanying text and infra apps. A and B. It generally incorporates the common-law rule.
See supra notes 16-18, 53 and accompanying text. As used in subdivision (2) of subsection
14.05 1(b), "disability" refers to the child's incapacitating mental or physical state or condition,
while "cause" refers to the underlying illness, injury or disease which is the basis of the
disability.
135. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text. In such circumstances, parents will
at least have some advance notice that they may be legally obligated to financially support a
child indefinitely in the future.
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himself;" however, the child might become so disabled after reaching
majority. In such a case, if the cause of the disability was known to
exist at the time the child reaches majority and, after reaching majority, the child finally becomes so disabled as to require substantial care
and personal supervision, and is unable to support himself, then subsection 14.051 may be applied.I36 Thus, a court is authorized to enter
a section 14.051 order after majority once the child's disability meets
the substantive tests contained in subsection 14.051(b)(1). Note that
the cause of the disability must be "known" to exist before the child
reaches eighteen; therefore, the mere fact that the "cause" of the disability may have in fact existed undetected during minority may not be
enough to trigger section 14.051 if that cause was not in fact "known"
to exist before the child reached majority. 37
4. Subsection 14.051(c)
An action under this section may be brought and maintained only by a
parent of the child. The parent may not transfer or assign the right to
bring or maintain an action under this section to any person, including
a governmental or private entity or agency, except for an assignment
made under Part D of Title IV of the federal Social Security Act, as
amended (42 U.S.C. Section 651 et seq.).
With one exception, only a "parent" has standing to bring or maintain an action under Family Code section 14.051.I'38 Further, a parent
136. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.05 1(b)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1991); see also supra notes
53-54 and accompanying text.
137. Note that the underlying "cause" of the eventual disability, not the actual disability,
must be known to exist before adulthood. See supra note 134. Undoubtedly, this "known to
exist" requirement may arguably lead to inequitable results in given cases, for example, when a
child's illness or disease clearly existed and could have been, but was not, detected prior to
majority. Cf supra note 133. However, requiring the "cause" to be "known" before majority
comports with the legislature's general philosophy of fixing some point in time when a parent
may predict, with some degree of certainty, his or her future financial obligations to an adult
child. See supra notes 57-60, 133 and accompanying text. Had the legislature intended to
make the availability of section 14.051 contingent merely upon the factual existence of the
cause of the disability during minority, without a pre-majority knowledge thereof, it could
have easily so stated.
138. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.051(c) (Vernon Supp. 1991). This limitation of suits
only by parents was first presented in the first draft of the 1987 legislation. See supra notes 5760 and accompanying text. The first sentence of subsection 14.051(c) was contained verbatim
in the Family Law Council's drafts. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text and infra
app. A. Likewise, the second sentence of the subsection was contained virtually verbatim in
the Family Law Council's draft. See infra app. A. The Legislative Council's version used only
the term "bring;" see supra note 64 and accompanying text and infra app. B; however, the
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is expressly prohibited from transferring or assigning this exclusive
right to any other person, expressly including a governmental or pri3 9 As will be discussed, this does not preclude
vate entity or agency. 1
a
nonparent's action for payment or reimbursement from a parent for
the care of a child under other laws or by contract;" it merely precludes a nonparent from directly relying upon section 14.051 as the
vehicle for obtaining those payments.
The only exception to a parent's inability to transfer or assign the
right to bring or maintain an action under Family Code section
14.051 is that a parent may assign this right under Part D of Title IV
of the federal Social Security Act.' 4 ' Thus, in Title IV-D cases, a
parent may assign his rights to the Attorney General of Texas to
bring or maintain an action under section 14.051 on the parent's behalf. 4 2 The use of the phrase "brought and maintained" refers not
only to initiating or commencing suit ("brought"), but also to inter43
vening or joining in a pending cause of action ("maintaining").'
While only a parent has standing to initiate or utilize a suit under
section 14.051, and only a parent may be ordered to pay support for a

Committee Substitute for S.B. 298 re-inserted the phrase "bring or maintain." See supra notes
68-69 and accompanying text. The exception in the second sentence of the subsection, related
to IV-D suits, first appeared in the Committee Substitute for S.B. 298. See id. It was inserted
at the request of the Texas Attorney General. This subsection incorporates one of the key
elements of the legislation, which was to limit standing under section 14.051 to parents. See
supra note 90 and accompanying text.
139. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.051(c) (Vernon Supp. 1991). "IT]he State cannot
recoup its costs for the care of an institutionalized adult child by virtue of this new statute."
Sampson, supra note 4, at 38. Even if a parent does contractually transfer or assign his rights
to seek child support under section 14.051 to an entity or agency, this transfer would seemingly be void and unenforceable.
140. See infra notes 207-09, 225-27 and accompanying text.
141. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.

§

14.05 1(c) (Vernon Supp. 1991). Part D of Title IV of

the federal Social Security Act authorizes a state-selected agency, such as the Attorney General in Texas, to establish and enforce child-support orders. See Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C.
Pt. D, §§ 651 et seq. Because the Title IV-D child-support program requires a parent to assign
his or her support rights to the State as a condition of receiving services from these programs,
subsection 14.051 (c) needed to have the exception for IV-D cases so as not to conflict with that
program. See TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. chs. 31 and 76 (Vernon 1980 and Pamphlet Supp.
1990); 42 U.S.C. §§ 601 et seq. and 651 et seq.
142. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.051(c) (Vernon Supp. 1991). The Texas Attorney
General is authorized to prosecute IV-D cases. See TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 76.002
(Vernon 1991). The Texas Attorney General's Office requested this exception of IV-D cases
from the anti-assignment provision in subsection 14.051(c).
143. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.051(c),(e) (Vernon Supp. 1991).
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child,'" nothing in section 14.051 or elsewhere prohibits a court from
ordering child support to be paid to a nonparent. 45 Thus, a court
may order either or both parents to pay support directly to a healthcare provider or to the child himself or his guardian or

representative. 146
5. Subsection 14.051(d)
An action
under this section may be brought regardless of the age of the
7
child.

14

As subsection 14.051(d) states, an action under Family Code sec-

tion 14.051 may be commenced at any time regardless of the age of
the child. 14

Thus, section 14.051 is available whether the disabled

child is still
a minor or is already an adult at the time the action is
49
brought.
6.

Subsection 14.051(e)

An action under this section may be brought as an independent cause of
action or as an action joined with any other action brought under this
code.' 50
144. See supra notes 22, 90, 109 and accompanying text.
145. See, e.g., TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.05(a) (Vernon Supp. 1991) (expressly autho-

rizes support paid "to the persons specified by the court..."). This section merely prohibits
nonparents from filing or intervening in suits founded on section 14.051, but it does not prohibit payments to nonparents under Section 14.05(a). Id.
146. See, e.g., White v. Adcock, 666 S.W.2d 222, 226 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1984, no writ) (portion of support ordered paid directly to children); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 14.05(a) (Vernon Supp. 1991).
147. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.051(d) (Vernon Supp. 1991). Now-repealed article
4639a-I expressly authorized support for a disabled child, whether a minor or an adult, but
this provision was not carried forward in old subsection 14.05(b) of the Family Code. See
supra notes 33-35, 39, 46 and accompanying text. Old subsection 14.05(b) was interpreted as
requiring a filed petition or motion for postmajority support before the child turned eighteen,
and this construction was later codified by an amendment to the section. See supra notes 44-50
and accompanying text. This new language in subsection 14.05 1(d) was contained verbatim in
every draft of the new legislation. See supra notes 61-80 and accompanying text and infra
apps. A and B. This subsection, along with the S.B. 298's applicability clause, should help
eliminate litigation over the applicability of new section 14.051. See infra notes 228-31 and
accompanying text. Subsection 14.05 1(d) conforms with several key elements of the new legislation. See supra notes 89, 92 and accompanying text.
148. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 14.05(b), 14.051(a),(f) (Vernon Supp. 1991).
149. Id. §§ 14.05(b), 14.051(a),(f).
150. Id. § 14.051(e). Neither now-repealed article 4639a-1 nor old Family Code subsection 14.05(b) contained a similar provision. See supra notes 33, 39, 46 and accompanying text.
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Subsection 14.051(e) expressly authorizes an action under Family
Code section 14.051 to be brought either as an independent cause of

action, such as a petition or a motion to modify solely seeking relief
under section 14.051, or as an action joined with any other cause of

action brought under the Family Code, such as a divorce suit.I51 This
provision was intended to remove any question regarding whether relief sought under section 14.051 may be requested in conjunction with
any other Family Code cause of action. 5 2

7.

Subsection 14.051(f)

If no court has continuing jurisdiction over the child, an action under
this section may be brought as an original suit affecting the parent-child
relationship. If there is a court of continuing jurisdiction over the
child, an action under this section may be brought as a petition for
further action under Section 11.07 of this code or a motion to modify
under Section 14.08 of this code. If the child is under 18 years of age at
the time an action to establish support is brought, the court may enter
orders under Section 14.05 or this section, or both.
Family Code subsection 14.05 1(f) governs venue and jurisdiction,
and specifically addresses support for minors. Section 14.051 confers

jurisdiction upon a court to order support for a disabled child, regardless of the age of the child.

53

If there is no court of continuing juris-

diction over the child, an action must be brought as an original suit
A similar provision was first contained in the 1987 legislation. See supra notes 57-60 and
accompanying text. This provision was contained in all drafts of S.B. 298. See supra notes 6180 and accompanying text and infra apps. A and B. The provision was modeled after similar
provisions in the Code. See infra note 151. Subsection 14.051(e) comports with several key
elements in the legislation. See supra notes 89, 92 and accompanying text.
151. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.051(e) (Vernon Supp. 1991); see also id. §§ 3.55
(Vernon 1975), 11.02(b) (Vernon 1986), 11.07 (Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1991), 14.08(a), 14.30(d),
14.31(b)(2) (Vernon 1986), 14.051(f) (Vernon Supp. 1991).
152. See id. § 14.051(e); TEX. R. Civ. P. 51.
153. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.051(f) (Vernon Supp. 1991). No similar provisions
existed under now-repealed article 4639a-1 or old Code subsection 14.05(b). See supra notes
33, 39, 46 and accompanying text. Some provisions similar in concept to new sentences one
and two of subsection 14.05 l(f) were attempted in the 1987 legislation. See supra notes 57-60
and accompanying text. Virtually identical versions of the three sentences of the subsection
existed in all drafts of the Family Law Council's proposed bills. See supra notes 61-62; infra
app. A. The Legislative Council's version of the last sentence began, "[i]f the child is a child
for the purpose of Section 14.05 of this code .... " see supra note 64 and accompanying text
and infra app. B, but the Committee Substitute for S.B. 298 amended this provision to read as
it presently does. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text. In the Family Law Council's
version, the first two sentences were in one section while the last sentence was in another; see
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affecting the parent-child relationship.1 5 4 An original suit would generally be appropriate in at least three situations: (1) where no prior
order affecting the minor or adult child has ever been entered (i.e., no
court has ever had jurisdiction over the child); (2) where a prior order
affecting a minor child has ceased to be effective under its own terms
or because the child has turned eighteen years of age or has otherwise
become emancipated (i.e., the court has lost continuing jurisdiction
over the child); or (3) where a prior order for support of an adult
child has terminated pursuant to its own terms. Alternatively, if there
is a court of continuing jurisdiction, the action must be brought in
that court either as a petition for further action or a motion to modify. "55
' This would apply where a prior order affecting a minor or an
adult child still is in effect under its own terms. An order for
postmajority support lodges in the court continuing jurisdiction over
the child until the order terminates under its own terms or otherwise. "56
' Thus, the first two sentences of subsection 14.051(f) should
minimize litigation over where a section 14.051 suit should be filed.' 57
The last sentence of Family Code subsection 14.051(f) provides
that, when the disabled child is still a minor, a support order may be
entered under either sections 14.05 or 14.051, or both. 5 8 Thus, at
one trial, while the child is still a minor, a court is authorized to enter
an order to establish support for the disabled child to be paid indefinitely, both before and after the child reaches majority. The only difference is the court's determination of the terms and amount of
support to be paid during the two different time periods.' 59 Section
14.05 and the standard child-support guidelines under sections
14.052-.058 govern the amount and terms of support to be paid while
supra notes 61-62 and infra app. A; however, all three sentences were combined in the Legislative Council's version. See supra note 64 and accompanying text; infra app. B.

154. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.04 (Vernon 1986). With respect to the availability
of section 14.051 as affected by the Code's definitions and provisions regarding "child" and
"parent" and the duration of the support provision, see supra notes 99 and 109 and accompanying text.
155. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.05 (Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1991). See generally id.
§§ 11.07 (petition for further action), 14.08(c)(2) (motion to modify).
156. See id. §§ 11.01(5), 11.05(a) (Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1991).
157. For example, confusion might have arisen if the child is now an adult and a prior

order for support of the child as a minor had already terminated. Now under subsection
14.05 1(f), in such a situation, since the court of continuing jurisdiction has lost jurisdiction, an

original suit must be filed, not a motion to modify. See supra notes 154-56.
158. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 14.05(a),(b), 14.051(f) (Vernon Supp. 1991).
159. See infra notes 160-61.
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a disabled child is a minor. 160 While the amount of support to be paid
after a disabled child reaches majority may be determined and ordered while the child is still a minor, subsection 14.05 1(g) governs the
amount of postmajority support. 6' Of course, evidence presented at
the trial from which the support order results must support the
62
amount of support ordered, regardless of when it is to be paid.

8. Subsection 14.051(g)
In determining the amount of support to be paid after a child's 18 birthday, the specific terms and conditions of that support, and the rights,
privileges, duties, and powers of both parents with respect to the support of the child, the court shall determine and give special consideration to: (1) any existing or future needs of the adult child directly
related to the adult child's mental or physical disability and the substantial care and personal supervision directly required by or related to
that disability; (2) whether the parent pays for or will pay for the care
or supervision of the adult child or provides or will provide substantial
160. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 14.05, 14.052-.058 (Vernon Supp. 1991) (new statutory child-support guidelines, effective September 1, 1989); see also id. § 14.051(g) (discussing
post-majority support); supra note 92.
161. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.051(g) (Vernon Supp. 1991); supra note 92 and
accompanying text.
162. An amount of child support may be determined in part by reference to a formula or
schedule. See Walton v. Walton, 567 S.w.2d 66, 68 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1978, no writ).
Indeed, the new statutory child-support guidelines direct courts to determine the amount of
support based upon the formulas, schedules and provisions set out in the guidelines. See TEX.
FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 14.052-.58 (Vernon Supp. 1991) (e.g., a percentage of the obligor's "net
resources," with the percentage based on the number of children). However, a child-support
order cannot authorize the future modification in the amount of support based merely upon
some arbitrary formula or schedule contained in the order. See, e.g., Euston v. Euston, 759
S.w.2d 788, 790 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1988, no writ); Price v. Price, 606 S.W.2d 51, 52 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1980, no writ); In Interest of J.M. & G.M., 585 S.w.2d 854, 856-57
(Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1979, no writ); Doss v. Doss, 521 S.W.2d 709, 713 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1975, no writ). Any court-ordered amount of support must be
based upon existing evidence then before the court. See, e.g., Tully v. Tully, 595 S.w.2d 887,
888 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1980, no writ); cf Cisneros v. Cisneros, 787 S.w.2d 550, 551-52
(Tex. App.-El Paso 1990, no writ). Of course, existing evidence then before the court could
justify a present order mandating or authorizing an increase or decrease in the amount of
support in the future. See, e.g., Friedman v. Friedman, 521 S.W.2d 111, 114 (Tex. Civ. App.Houston [14th Dist.] 1975, no writ) (amount of support decreased as each of several children
turned eighteen). Indeed, the new statutory child-support guidelines provide that if the order
governs support for more than one child, any order to decrease support as any of the children
reach majority or are otherwise emancipated should be reduced to an amount which corresponds to the appropriate lower percentage under the guidelines. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 14.055 (Vernon Supp. 1991).
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care or personal supervision of the adult child; (3) the financial resources available to both parents for the support, care, and supervision
of the adult child; and (4) any other financial resources or other resources or programs available for the support, care, and supervision of
the adult child.

Family Code subsection 14.051(g) addresses the amount of
postmajority support and the terms of an order requiring support of a
1 63
disabled child that is to be paid after the child becomes an adult.
Although an order to establish postmajority support may be entered
while a disabled child is still a minor, subsection 14.051(g) must be
used to determine the amount and terms of the adult child support. 16'
Balancing the relaxed substantive standards under subsection
14.05 1(b)(1),' 65 subsection (g) limits a court's discretion in determin-

163. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.051(g) (Vernon Supp. 1991). No similar provision existed in any predecessor statutes to section 14.051 or in the 1987 proposed legislation. See
supra notes 33, 39, 46, 57-58 and accompanying text. The Legislative Council's version somewhat modified the Family Law Council's version; however, subsection (g) of the Committee
Substitute for S.B. 298 was reworded to primarily conform with the Family Law Council's
draft. See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text; infra apps. A and B. The primary
changes between the Legislative Council's version and the Committee Substitute for S.B. 298
were as follows. First, the first sentence of the Legislative Council's version of subsection (g)
had read, "[i]n determining the amount of support for an adult child ... " but the italicized
phrase was deleted and substituted with the present phrase, "to be paid after a child's 18th
birthday ....
Compare infra app. B with TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.051(g) (Vernon Supp.
1991). As originally drafted, courts might have misinterpreted subsection 14.051(g) as being
applicable only in suits in which the child was already over eighteen, whereas the new language is not so limiting. Under the new language, subsection 14.051 (g) can still be applied in a
suit in which the child is still a minor. However, it only determines the amount payable after
the child reaches majority, and this amount must be supported by evidence at the present trial.
See supra notes 92, 159-61 and accompanying text. Second, the Legislative Council's use of
the term "a parent" was changed to "both parents" in the introductory sentence of subsection
(g), to emphasize once again that adult child support is the responsibility of both parents according to their respective abilities. See supra notes 91, 110 and accompanying text and infra
app. B. Third, and importantly, the Legislative Council's draft, in the introductory sentence,
merely required a court to "consider" the following four categories of factors, whereas Committee Substitute for S.B. 298 required a court to "determine and give special consideration to"
the four subdivisions. See infra app. B.; supra notes 64-69 and accompanying text; infra notes
169-71. Finally, the term "child" used throughout the four subdivisions in the Legislative
Council's version was amended to read "adult child" in Committee Substitute for S.B. 298.
See infra app. B; supra notes 68-69. This comports with one of the key elements of the legislation. See supra note 93 and accompanying text. Focusing the court's attention on certain
factors in subsection 14.051(g) is intended to counter-balance the slight lessening of the substantive standard under subsection 14.051(b)(1). See supra notes 119-27 and accompanying
text; infra notes 165-66.
164. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.051(g) (Vernon Supp. 1991).
165. See id. § 14.051(b)(1); supra notes 119-27.
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ing the amount and the terms of the support order, as well as the
rights and duties of both parents with respect to the support, that are
effective, or that will become effective, after the child turns
eighteen.16 6
The phrase "specific terms and conditions of that support" refers to
the provisions of an order addressing to whom and in what manner
the support is to be paid and the duration of the support order.1 67
The language referring to "the rights, privileges, duties, and powers of
both parents" gives a court broad authority to enter orders regarding
both parents with respect to a disabled child's postmajority support;
however, the phrase "with respect to the support of the child" limits
such an order to terms and conditions affecting the support of the
child and does not open the door to postmajority conservatorship or
possession orders.' 6 8
This subsection also states that the court "shall determine and give
special consideration to" the categories of factors listed under the four
subdivisions in subsection 14.05 1(g).1 69 As originally introduced, S.B.
298 merely stated that the Court "shall consider" the four categories
in determining the amount and terms of support; however, Senate
Committee Substitute S.B. 298 substituted the phrase "determine and
give special consideration to," thus requiring a court to concentrate
on the four subdivisions of subsections 14.051(g) 70 as the basis for
determining the amount of the adult child support. The phrase "shall
determine" supports a requirement that, upon request, a court must
enter findings of fact and conclusions of law with reference to the
factors listed in subdivisions (1)-(4) of subsection (g).111 Although a
court is required to consider these factors, this subsection is not an
exclusive list. Thus, while a court must consider subsection (g) factors, it may also consider other factors in determining the amount and
terms of postmajority support. Subsection (g) was intended to preclude a court's rote application of a percentage of an obligor's net
resources in determining postmajority support, and to direct a court
to concentrate, instead, on requiring both parents to support an adult
166. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.051(g) (Vernon Supp. 1991) (governing support of
adult child); supra notes 119-27.
167. See supra notes 113-17 and infra note 181 and accompanying text.
168. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.051(g),(h) (Vernon Supp. 1991).
169. See id. § 14.051(g).
170. See id.; supra notes 64-69 and accompanying text and infra apps. A and B.
171. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 296.
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disabled child based upon those needs and resources directly related to
the disability.172 Thus, the total amount of support may, under subdivision (g), be less than, equal to, or greater than an amount of support
calculated under the standard child-support guidelines applicable to
minor children, but this support should be borne by both parents according to their relative abilities to provide the support.'7 3
Subdivisions (1) through (4) of subsection 14.051(g) address the
support of an "adult child," which term is defined in subsection
14.051(a) as a child eighteen years of age or older. 174 Under subdivision (1) of subsection (g) a court must determine and consider those
costs and expenses directly required by or related to a child's disabilities.' 75 Subdivision (2) requires a court to determine and give special
consideration to whether either parent actually pays for or provides
1 76
the substantial care or personal supervision for the adult child.
Subdivision (3) requires a court to determine and give special consideration to "financial resources available" to "both" parents for the
support and supervision of the adult child. 177 Finally, subdivision (4)
of subsection (g) is a catch-all provision requiring a court to deter172. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.051(g) (Vernon Supp. 1991). A rote application of
a percentage of an obligor's net resources is the general approach under the standard childsupport guidelines applicable to healthy minor children. See id. §§ 14.052-.058. A court's
child-support order will not be disturbed on appeal unless the complaining party can show a
clear abuse of discretion, the test for which is whether the court acted without reference to any
guiding rules or principles, in other words, whether the act was arbitrary or unreasonable.
Worford v. Stamper, 801 S.W.2d 108, 109 (Tex. 1990) (per curiam) (upholding trial court's
amount of support for adult disabled child). The "guiding rules or principles" for determining
the amount of postmajority support would be section 14.051(g).
173. Some expert testimony may be required to prove the needs and supervision directly
related to the adult child's disabilities. See, e.g., Waltz v. Waltz, 776 S.W.2d 320, 322 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, no writ) (recovery under order requiring father to pay children's reasonable medical expenses required expert testimony that expenses incurred were
"reasonable").
174. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.051(a),(g)(1)-(4) (Vernon Supp. 1991).
175. Id. § 14.051(g)(1).
176. Id. § 14.051(g)(2).
177. Id. § 14.051(g)(3). Again, as throughout all of section 14.051, the emphasis is on
"both" parents' responsibilities with respect to an adult child. The Legislative Council's draft,
at subdivision (3), referenced "each parent," see infra app. B, but the Committee Substitute for
S.B. 298 was changed to "both parents." See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text. "Financial resources" would include any income from any public or private source, property or
asset. The term "available" implies resources which are not necessarily in a parent's present
possession and control but over which the parent has a present legal right to possession or
present ability to obtain (e.g., unliquidated assets, future loans, deferred benefits or payments,
etc.).
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mine and give special consideration to "any other financial resources"
or "other resources or programs" available from any source for the
support and supervision of the adult child. 7 s
9.

Subsection 14.051(h)

An order under this section may contain provisions governing the

rights, privileges, duties, and powers of both parents with respect to the
support of the child and may be modified or enforced in the same manner as any other order under this title.179
Family Code subsection 14.051(h) addresses the contents, and the
modification and enforcement, of orders entered under new section
14.051.180 Like subsection 14.05 l(g), subsection (h) authorizes an order governing the rights and duties of "both" parents, but only "with
respect to the support of the child."'I8 It further clarifies that an existing order already entered pursuant to new section 14.051 may
thereafter be modified or enforced to the same extent as any other

178. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.05 l(g)(4) (Vernon Supp. 1991). This last category refers to both financial and nonfinancial resources and programs available from sources other
than the parents, whether public or private. Again, the term "available" implicitly includes
resources and programs which are available but have not yet been utilized or obtained.
179. Id. § 14.051(h). No similar provision existed in now-repealed article 4639a-1, old
subsection 14.05(b), or the 1987 legislation. See supra notes 33, 39, 46, 57-58 and accompanying text. The present language was contained virtually verbatim in the Family Law Council's
draft, see infra app. A, but was substantially shortened in the Legislative Council's version.
See infra app. B. That portion of present subsection 14.051(h) which begins with "contain"
and ends with the second "may" was added to subsection (h) in the Committee Substitute for
S.B. 298. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
180. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.051(h) (Vernon Supp. 1991); see also id. § 14.05(i).
For suggested form provisions for an order requiring postmajority support for a disabled child,
see 2 STATE BAR OF TEXAS, TEXAS FAMILY LAW PRACTICE MANUAL 6.59 (1990) and
Kazen, Support, in 3 FAMILY LAW - TEXAS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 51.10A[2]
(Kazen ed. 1989).
181. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.051(h) (Vernon Supp. 1991). With respect to the
phrase "rights, privileges, duties, and powers," the court has the discretion to determine
whether one or both parents should be ordered to pay support, the amount of the support, the
recipient of the support, the duration, suspension, and alteration of the support payments,
whether the support should be paid through a support-collection agency, and the other terms
and conditions relating to the adult support payment. See, e.g., Tharp v. Tharp, 438 S.W.2d
391, 393 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1969, writ dism'd); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 14.051(g) (Vernon Supp. 1991); see also supra notes 113-17, 168 and accompanying text.
The court may determine if a withholding order, or an order for a bond or other security to
secure the payments, should be entered. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 14.05(e), 14.42-.43
(Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1991). However, the factors set out in subsection 14.051(g) still affect
the court's discretion regarding the amount of adult child support. See supra notes 163-78.
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child-support order."8 2
A new order entered under section 14.051 may be subsequently

modified pursuant to Family Code subsection 14.08(c)(2). 18 3 If a

prior order for adult child support was never entered or, having been
entered, is no longer in effect, there is no prior order to be modified;
however, adult support may be established, or re-established, in an
original suit pursuant to subsections 14.05 1(b), (d), (e) and (f) and the
applicability clause of S.B. 298.184 The affirmative defense of resjudicata apparently would not bar a new suit under section 14.051 if a
prior opportunity or attempt to obtain adult support was not available
for trial on the merits or was denied on the legal basis of a lack of
authority or jurisdiction for the entry of such an order at the time of
the request.'
On the other hand, if a prior attempt to obtain adult
support was litigated on the merits and denied based on factual
grounds, then res judicata may apply to bar the new cause of action
unless the presently litigated factual circumstances are proven materially and substantially different from the factual circumstances existing
86
at the time of the prior suit.1

182. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.051(h) (Vernon Supp. 1991); see infra notes 183-210.
183. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.08(c)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1991).
184. See id. § 14.051(b), (d), (e), (f); see also infra note 228 and accompanying text.
185. Section 14.051 creates a new legal cause of action or, technically, a new legal availability of a pre-existing cause of action. In such cases, resjudicatadoes not seem to be a bar.
See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Duel, 324 U.S. 154 (1944); Muchard v. Berenson,
307 F.2d 368, 369-70 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 962 (1963); Marino v. State Farm Fire &
Cas. Ins. Co., 787 S.W.2d 948, 949-50 (Tex. 1990) ("resjudicata is not a defense in a subsequent action if there has been a change in the material facts, the applicable statutory law, or the
decisional law between the first judgment and the second suit." (emphasis added)); State v.
Standard, 414 S.W.2d 148, 151 (Tex. 1967); see also Scaling v. Williams, 284 S.W. 310, 312-13
(Tex. Civ. App.-Ft. Worth 1926, no writ). See generally 48 TEX. JUR.3d Judgments §§ 367,
382, 384 (1986). "[I]f there has been a material change in the basic factual or legal situation
existing at the time [the prior judgment] was rendered, the judgment may lose its conclusive
character." 48 TEX. JUR.3d Judgments § 367, at 431-32 (emphasis added); accord State Farm
Mut. Auto Ins Co., 324 U.S. at 162; Marino, 787 S.W.2d at 949-50; Standard, 414 S.W.2d at
151; Powell v. Powell, 703 S.W.2d 434, 436 (Tex. App.-Waco 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Ex
parte Boyd, 157 S.W. 254, 255 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1913, no writ); cf Moreno v.
Alejandro, 775 S.W.2d 735, 738-39 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1989, no writ) (where asset
could not in fact be divided pursuant to divorce decree, res judicata does not apply).
186. See, e.g., Ogletree v. Crates, 363 S.W.2d 431, 434-36 (Tex. 1963); Wilson v. Elliott,
96 Tex. 472, 476-77, 73 S.W. 946, 946-47 (1903); Schumann v. Abernathy, 442 S.W.2d 455,
456-57 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1969, no writ); Doherty v. Doherty, 279 S.W.2d 690, 695 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Austin 1955, no writ); see also Villarreal v. Villarreal, 684 S.W.2d 214, 218 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi 1984, no writ); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.08(c)(2) (Vernon Supp.
1991) ("material change" test to modify support order).
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Enforcing an order entered under section 14.051 is somewhat complicated. Family Code subsection 14.051(h) provides that an order
entered under new section 14.051 "may be ...

enforced in the same

manner as any other order under this title." 187 Child-related orders
entered under Family Code Title 2 may be enforced under Title 2,
Subtitle A, Chapter 14, Subchapter B.1 ss The express remedies set
out in Subchapter B are not a limit on and do not preclude the "use of
any other civil or criminal proceeding to enforce child support obligations....""'

The two primary Family Code enforcement remedies

set out under Subchapter B to collect back-due support are an action
for contempt under section 14.40 and an action for a money judgment
under section 14.41.90 The mere fact that a child is an adult does not

per se preclude either of these remedies.'91
A court has jurisdiction to enter a contempt judgment under section 14.40 only if the motion is filed "within six months after: (1) the
child becomes an adult, or (2) the date on which the child support
obligation generally terminates pursuant to the decree or order or by
'
operation of law." 192
This is a jurisdictional (substantive), not a procedural (statute of), limitation.1 93 Generally, when a "child becomes
an adult" a parent's child-support obligation terminates "by operation
of law;" ' 94 therefore, depending on how section 14.40 is interpreted,
the Family Code contempt section may be a limited remedy to enforce back-due adult support payments ordered under new section
14.051.195 However, since this Code's contempt provision is not an
exclusive method for enforcing child-related orders, other laws may
be utilized to enforce a section-14.051 order. As with any other civil
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
Ex parte

TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.051(h) (Vernon Supp. 1991).
See id. §§ 14.30-.51 (Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1991).
Id. § 14.30(d) (Vernon 1986).
See id. §§ 14.40-.41 (Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1991).
See id. See generally Huff v. Huff, 648 S.W.2d 286 (Tex. 1983) (judgment action);
Hooks, 415 S.W.2d 166 (Tex. 1967).

192. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.40(b) (Vernon 1986).

193. Id. § 14.41(b); see infra note 202.
194. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.40(b) (Vernon 1986).
195. Whether subdivisions (1) and (2) of Family Code Section 14.40(b) are mutually exclusive is uncertain, that is, whether subdivision (1) operates to terminate the support obligations independently of subdivision (2), and vice versa. If so, then when the child becomes "an
adult" under subdivision (1), this alone would suffice to terminate a section-14.051 support

order, notwithstanding subdivision (2). However, if each subdivision stands independently,
then subdivision (2) would apply to enforce a section-14.051 support order, despite the age of
the child, at least until six months after the order terminates under its own terms.
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order entered under the Family Code or any other law, any court has
inherent power and statutory authority to enforce its orders by contempt.196 Contempt orders entered under section 14.051 may likewise
be invoked to enforce this general power and authority. 97 Unlike
money judgments, the Family Code provides no statute of limitations
for contempt actions; however, case law has adopted the general9 8fouryear statute of limitations for child-support contempt actions.
Distinct from a contempt action is a Family Code action for a
money judgment for past-due support payments under section
14.41.199 The Code provides that each "periodic" support payment
''not timely made shall constitute a final judgment for the amount due
and owing. ' 200 However, a court's jurisdiction to enter a money judgment is retained only if a motion for an arrearage judgment "is filed
within four years after: (1) the child becomes an adult; or (2) the date
on which the child support obligation terminates pursuant to the decree or order or by operation of law."" '' This is a jurisdictional limit
on the availability of the section.20 2 As with the contempt provision,
depending on how section 14.41 is interpreted, the Family Code judgment remedy may be of limited value in enforcing adult support pay196. See, e.g., Ex parte Gorena, 595 S.W.2d 841, 845 (Tex. 1979); Ex parte Browne, 543
S.W.2d 82, 86 (Tex. 1976); Ex parte Ortega, 759 S.W.2d 191, 192 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1988, original proceeding); TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. §§ 21.001-.002 (Vernon 1988 &
Supp. 1990).

197. See supra note 196.
198. See Ex parte McNemee, 605 S.W.2d 353, 357 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1980, orig.
proceeding); Ex parte Payne, 598 S.W.2d 312, 318 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1980, orig.
proceeding) (relying on TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5529, which has now been repealed
and recodified as TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 16.051 (Vernon 1986)).
199. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.41 (Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1991).
200. Id. § 14.41(a) (Vernon Supp. 1991).
201. Id. § 14.41(b).
202. See id. Family Code subsections 14.40(b) and 14.41(b) contain virtually identical
sentences referencing the court's retention of jurisdiction to enforce the order after the child
becomes an adult. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 14.40(b), 14.41(b) (Vernon 1986 & Supp.
1991) (different time limits apply, i.e., 6 months for contempt, 4 years for money judgment).
These are not statutes of limitations but are statutory grants of jurisdiction to the court. On

the other hand, the first sentence of subsection 14.41(b), concerning money judgments, is a
statute of limitations. See infra note 205. In view of the jurisdictional extensions provided in

subsections 14.40(b) and 14.41(b), the mere fact that the child has become an adult does not
alone render the order unenforceable. See, e.g., In Interest of C.L.C., 760 S.W.2d 790, 792
(Tex. App.-Beaumont 1988, no writ); Ex parte Wilbanks, 722 S.W.2d 221, 223 (Tex. App.Amarillo 1986, original proceeding); see also Ex parte Hooks, 415 S.W.2d 166, 168 (Tex.
1967). See generally Ruffin v. Ruffin, 753 S.W.2d 824 (Tex. App.-Houston (14th Dist.] 1988,

no writ).
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ments under a section-14.051 order.20 3 There is no other statute
authorizing courts to enter money judgments for past-due support.2°
Unlike an action for contempt, the Family Code does expressly set
forth a ten-year statute of limitations for money judgments for pastdue child support.2 °5 Suit may be brought against the defaulting parent or his estate.2°6
A child-support obligation imposed by contract, such as by a consensual (contractual) divorce decree or postdivorce order, or by an
agreement incident to divorce incorporated into a divorce decree, may
be enforced by an independent contract suit, but only if the agreement, consensual decree, or order expressly so provides. 20 7 The fact

that the child is an adult does not per se prohibit such a suit. 20 8 The

four-year statute of limitations applies to contract causes of action.20 9
Finally, the criminal nonsupport section of the Texas Penal Code is
available to prosecute a parent if he "fails to provide support for his
of a court order requiring the individual
child ... who is the subject
' 210
child.
the
to support
203. See supra note 195.
204. See Comment, Enforcement of Unpaid Child Support PaymentsAgainst a Decedent's
Estate, 32 BAYLOR L. REV. 269, 271 (1980). For contract actions on agreed support orders,
see infra notes 207-09.
205. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.41(b) (Vernon Supp. 1991); see also Huff v. Huff,
648 S.W.2d 286, 289-90 (Tex. 1983); Shannon v. Fowler, 693 S.W.2d 54, 56 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 1985, writ dism'd) (statute begins to run on each individual payment when it accrues);
Houtchens v. Matthews, 557 S.W.2d 581, 585 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1977, writ
dism'd). These cases were not based on Family Code section 14.41(b) or its predecessor, nowrepealed Family Code 14.09, but relied on the general 10-year statute of limitations. The 10year statute relied on was Revised Civil Statute Article 5532, which has now been repealed and
recodified. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 31.006 (Vernon 1986). Since subsection 14.41(b) is a substantive limitation on the court's power to act rather than a procedural
statute of limitation, it need not be plead as an affirmative defense under Texas Rule of Civil
Procedure 94. Jordan v. Middleton, 762 S.W.2d 339, 342 n.1 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1988, no writ); Sandford v. Sandford, 732 SW.2d 449, 451 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, no writ).
206. See, e.g., Adair v. Martin, 595 S.W.2d 513, 514-15 (Tex. 1980) (can use Probate
Code section 37 with Family Code section 14.09(c)(now-repealed and superseded by Family
Code section 14.41) to sue estate for deceased's unpaid child support); TEX. PROB. CODE
ANN. § 37 (Vernon Supp. 1991) (obligation for debts of deceased is on his estate). See generally Comment, Enforcement of Unpaid Child Support Payments Against a Decedent'sEstate, 32
BAYLOR L. REV. 269 (1980).
207. Elfeldt v. Elfeldt, 730 S.W.2d 657, 658 (Tex. 1987) (per curiam); TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. § 14.06(d) (Vernon 1986); supra notes 21, 26 and infra notes 222-24.
208. See infra note 209.
209. See TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.004 (Vernon 1986).
210. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 25.05(a) (Vernon 1989). The offense under subsection
(a) is broken into two types: (1) the failure to "provide support for his child younger than
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10. Subsection 14.051(i)
Except as otherwise provided by this section, proceedings under this
section are the same as in a suit affecting the parent-child relationship.

Except as otherwise provided by this section, all substantive and procedural rights and remedies under this code or otherwise which relate to
the establishment, modification, or enforcement of child support orders
shall apply to actions brought or orders entered under this section.2 11
Family Code subsection 14.051(i) addresses procedural matters

generally. It broadly provides that all proceedings under new section
14.051 shall be treated as proceedings in any other suit affecting the
parent-child relationship.2 12 Any right or remedy available under any

federal or Texas law (including the Texas Family Code) to either establish, modify or enforce a child-support order, applies to actions
under new section 14.05 1.213
11.

Subsection 14.0510)

This section does not affect a parent's: (1) cause of action for the support of a disabled child under any other law; or (2) ability to contract
for the support of a disabled child.214

Family Code subsection 14.0510) is intended not only to mean
eighteen years of age;" and (2) the failure to provide support "for his child . . . who is the
subject of a court order requiring the individual to support the child." TEX. PENAL CODE
ANN. § 25.05(a) (Vernon 1989). The latter provision does not reference age, as does the first.
Therefore, this provision may be available to prosecute a parent for criminal nonsupport if the
parent fails to comply with a court order under Family Code section 14.051.
211. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.051(i) (Vernon Supp. 1991). No similar provisions
existed under now-repealed article 4639a-l or old Family Code subsection 14.05(b). See supra
notes 33, 39, 46 and accompanying text. A few similar provisions existed under the 1987
proposed legislation. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text. Both sentences of the
subsection existed virtually verbatim in the Family Law Council's drafts, see infra app. A, and
while the second sentence was deleted from the Legislative Council's draft, see infra app. B, it
was included in the Committee Substitute for S.B. 298. See supra notes 68-69.
212. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.051(i) (Vernon Supp. 1991); see also id. § 11.14(a)
(Vernon 1986) ("[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this subtitle, proceedings shall be as in civil
cases generally.").
213. Id. § 14.051(i). The intent behind this "catch-all" subsection is to help alleviate any
confusion in suits to establish, modify or enforce orders entered under new section 14.051.
214. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.051(j) (Vernon Supp. 1991). No similar provision was
contained in now-repealed article 4639a-1, old subsection 14.05(b), or the 1987 draft legislation. See supra notes 33, 39, 46, 57-58 and accompanying text. This provision was contained
virtually verbatim in the Family Law Council's drafts, see infra app. A, and in all versions of
S.B. 298. See supra notes 61-80 and accompanying text and infra app. B.
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what it says, but to highlight other provisions of law which may provide some relief to parents for the care of their disabled children and
which allow parents to contract between themselves and with others
for such support.2 15 Subsection 14.0510)(1) serves as notification of
other laws available to parents regarding support of disabled children.2 16 For example, Texas Probate Code section 423 provides that
able relatives shall maintain an incompetent person with no estate in
the following priority: spouse, parent, child and grandchildren.2 17 If
no relative is able to do so, the county maintains the support.2"'
While this may undoubtedly obligate parents to maintain an incompetent minor, Probate Code section 423 is generally considered to require repeated suits for past-due debts against a parent or other
relative who refuses to reimburse the entity or person who has provided necessary support for the incompetent child.21 9 A question exists as to whether Probate Code section 423 is available to require one
parent to pay direct, periodic child-support payments to the other
parent. One case has held that a parent, as a guardian of the child,
could use Probate Code section 423 to require periodic child support
from the other parent. 220 Another court has held that section 423
does not apply unless the State seeks reimbursement and that the section does not otherwise create a private cause of action by one parent
22 1
against the other.
Subdivision (2) of Family Code subsection 14.0510) states that the
section does not affect a parent's ability to contract for support for a
disabled child.2 22 Thus, parents may, by way of an agreement incident to divorce, agreed (consensual) decree or order, or an independent contract, enter into contractual agreements between themselves
for the parental support of an adult child.223 A parent may also con215. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.051(j) (Vernon Supp. 1991).
216. Id. § 14.0510)(1).
217. See TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 423 (Vernon Supp. 1980).
218. Id.
219. See, e.g., Red v. Red, 552 S.W.2d 90, 91, 98 (Tex. 1977); State v. Stone, 290 S.W.2d
761, 762 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1956, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
220. See Adkins v. Adkins, 743 S.W.2d 745, 746-47 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1987, writ denied); Price, supra note 4, at E-12 to E-14.
221. See Runnells v. Firestone, 746 S.W.2d 845, 852 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]),
writ deniedper curiam, 760 S.W.2d 240 (Tex. 1988). In denying the petition for writ of error,
the Supreme Court expressly declined to approve the Court of Appeal's interpretation of Section 423. Runnels, 760 S.W.2d at 240.
222. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.051(j)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1991).
223. See, e.g., Elfeldt v. Elfeldt, 730 S.W.2d 657, 658 (Tex. 1987) (per curiam); Busbey v.
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tract with a third party for the care and supervision of a disabled
child; however, as noted, a parent may not transfer or assign his rights
under section 14.051 to a third party.224
12.

Subsection 14.051(k)

This section does not affect the substantive or the procedural rights or
remedies of a person other than a parent, including a governmental or
private entity or agency, with
respect to the support of the disabled
225
child under any other law.

Family Code subsection 14.05 1(k) is intended to mean what it says,
and also to make entities and agencies, as well as parents, aware of the
existence of other laws regarding support of children. Although only
a "parent" may bring or maintain a cause of action under Family
Code section 14.051, and entities and agencies are expressly prohibited from doing SO, 2 26 there are other specific statutory causes of action available to nonparents allowing them to seek support payments
or reimbursement from parents and other relatives for the care and
supervision of a child.227
13.

Effective Date and Applicability Clause

Section 3 of S.B. 298 provides an express effective date and an applicability clause for new Family Code section 14.051 as follows:
This Act takes effect September 1, 1989, and applies only to a suit
pending or filed on or after that date to establish an order for support or
to modify or enforce an order previously established, whether the disBusbey, 619 S.W.2d 472, 475 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, no writ); Holder v.

Holder, 528 S.W.2d 113, 115-16 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1975, no writ); TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. § 14.06(d) (Vernon 1986); supra notes 21, 26, 207-09. See generally Price, supra note 4,
at E-58, E-64 to E-65.
224. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.

§

14.051(c) (Vernon Supp. 1991).

225. Id. § 14.051(k). No similar provision existed in now-repealed article 4639a-1, old
Family Code subsection 14.05(b), or the 1987 draft legislation. See supra notes 33, 39, 46, 5758 and accompanying text. This provision existed virtually verbatim in all versions of S.B.
298. See supra notes 61-80 and infra apps. A and B.
226. See supra notes 138-39, 144-45 and accompanying text.
227. See, e.g., TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 35.001-.013 (chronically ill and
disabled children); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 3196a, § 2 (Vernon Supp. 1991) (state
hospitals), 3198 (hydrophobia), 3202-a (Vernon 1986) (other institutions); see also TEX. HUM.
REs. CODE ANN. §§ 32.001-.003, 111.059 (Vernon 1980 & Supp. 1991). See generally Price,
supra note 4, at E-14 to E-16.
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abled child is a minor or an adult.228
Thus, section 14.051 took effect on September 1, 1989 and expressly
applies to any suit pending, or brought on or after, the effective date.
The broad scope of the applicability clause was intended to eliminate
litigation regarding the applicability of new section 14.051 under different fact situations involving, for example, the age of the child (1)
when the suit is brought, (2) when the Code or this particular section
went into effect, or (3) at the filing time of prior suits or orders, or the
present suit. When article 4639a-1, a predecessor to Family Code section 14.051,229 was enacted, there was a flurry of suits involving the
application of the act. 230 Also, similar litigation arose involving the
applicability of a 1953 amendment to old article 4639a (general statute authorizing child support) which raised the age limit of the child,
for purposes of court-ordered child support, from sixteen to eighteen
years of age. 2 31 These suits involved issues relating to whether the
new legislation could be applied to cases where the child had already
become an adult. The all-inclusive nature of the language of the applicability clause of S.B. 298 should make it clear, as should various
provisions in section 14.051 itself, that new Family Code section
14.051 applies to any disabled child of any age, and may be utilized
regardless of the age of the child when (1) the Family Code was enacted, (2) new section 14.051 went into effect, (3) a prior order was
entered, or (4) the present suit was filed.232

228. Act of May 26, 1989, ch. 368, § 2, 1989 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 1457, 1458 (Vernon).
The effective date was the same in all drafts of the legislation. See supra notes 61-80 and
accompanying text; infra apps. A and B. The Family Law Council's draft bill's applicability
clause was much more specific, detailed and all encompassing; see infra app. A; however, the
Legislative Council's draft was much more limited and potentially confusing. See infra app. B.
The version of the clause inserted in the Committee Substitute for S.B. 298 was much more
akin to the Family Law Council's version. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
229. See supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text.
230. See Ex parte Hatch, 410 S.W.2d 773, 777 (Tex. 1967); Tharp v. Tharp, 438 S.W.2d
391, 394 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1969, writ dism'd); Cuellar v. Cuellar, 406
S.W.2d 510, 512 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1966,, no writ), disapproved in Ex parte
Hatch, 410 S.W.2d at 778; Price, supra note 4, at E-40 to E-43; see also Ex parte Hooks, 415
S.W.2d 166, 167-68 (Tex. 1967).
231. See McGowen v. McGowen, 273 S.W.2d 658, 659-60 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1954, writ dism'd); Du Pre v. Du Pre, 271 S.W.2d 829, 832 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1954, no
writ); supra note 29 and accompanying text. See generally Price, supra note 4, at E-41.
232. See In Matter of Marriage of Roads, 773 S.W.2d 28 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1989,
writ denied) (amendment allowing court to appoint parents as joint managing conservators
absent agreement applied to suits pending on its effective date).
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

In summary, a disabled adult child now may receive court-ordered
child support for an indefinite time if, whether institutionalized or
not, the child (1) requires substantial care and personal supervision
because of the physical or mental disability, (2) the child will not be
able to support himself, and (3) the child's disability exists, or the
cause of the disability is known to exist, before or on the child's eighteenth birthday. Prior law conditioned postmajority child support
upon whether suit was filed before the child turned eighteen years old,
while new Family Code section 14.051 conditions this support upon
when the child's disability arose. The suit may be brought regardless
of the age of the child. With only one exception, only a parent has
standing to bring suit under section 14.051. The emphasis is on both
parents sharing the cost of the child's postmajority disability. The
amount of child support is set by focusing upon the financial needs
directly related to the child's disability. Thus, while broadening an
adult child's ability to receive support, the new law lessens each parent's individual burden in providing that support.
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APPENDIX A-FAMILY LAW COUNCIL DRAFT
A BILL TO BE ENTITLED
AN ACT
relating to support for a minor or adult disabled child for an indefinite period.
BE IT ENACTED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF
TEXAS:
SECTION 1. Section 14.05(b), Family Code, is amended by deleting the present section and substituting therefor as follows:
(b) The court may order either or both parents to provide for the support of a
minor or adult disabled child for an indefinite period as provided under Section
14.051 of this code.
SECTION 2. Chapter 14, Family Code, is amended by adding Section
14.051 to read as follows:
Sec. 14.051. SUPPORT OF A MINOR OR ADULT DISABLED CHILD
FOR AN INDEFINITE PERIOD.
(a) Forpurposes of this section only, "child" means a minor or an adult son or
daughter of the parents.
(b) Notwithstanding any other law, if the court finds that the child, whether
institutionalizedor not, requires substantialcare andpersonal supervision because
of a mental or physical disabilityand will not be able to support himself, the court
may enter orders under this section for the support of the child for an indefinite
period. An order may be entered under this section only if the disability exists, or
the cause of the disability is known to exist, before or at the time that the child
attains 18 years of age. An order may not be entered under this section if the
disability first arose after the time that the child attained 18 years of age, provided, however, that this section does not affect a parent's cause of action with
respect to the support of a disabled child under any other law or affect a parent's
ability to contract with respect to support of a disabled child.
(c) Except as otherwiseprovided herein, proceedings under this section shall be
as in suits affecting the parent-child relationship generally, and all substantive
and proceduralrights and remedies under this code relating to the establishment,
modification and enforcement of child support orders shall apply to actions
brought and orders entered under this section.
(d) An action under this section may be brought and maintained only by a
parent of the child and may not be brought or maintained by a person who is not a
parent of the child, including a governmentalor private entity or agency, notwithstanding any assignment or transfer of rights by a parent to a person, entity or
agency; provided, however, that this section does not affect the substantive or procedural rights or remedies of a person, entity or agency with respect to support of a
disabled child under any other law. An action under this section may be brought
whether the child is a minor or an adult, and may be brought as an independent
cause of action or as an action joined with any other action brought under this
code. If no court has continuingjurisdiction over the child, an action under this
section may be brought as an originalsuit affecting the parent-childrelationship.
If a court has continuingjurisdiction over the child, an action under this section
may be brought as a petitionfor further action under Section 11.07 of this code or
a motion to modify under Section 14.08 of this code.
(e) With respect to a disabled child who is a minor at the time that a cause of
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action to establish support is brought, a court may enter orders under Section
14.05 of this code or this section, or both. With respect to orders entered under
this section which provide for supportafter the child's 18th birthday, in determining the amount of supportfor the adult child, the specific terms and conditions of
supportfor the adult child, and the rights, privileges, duties and powers of both
parents with respect to the support of the adult child, the court shall determine
and give special consideration to the following factors: any existing or future
needs of the adult child directly related to the adult child's mental or physical
disability and the substantialcare andpersonalsupervision directly required by or
related to the adult child's actual mental or physical disability; whether the parent
in fact pays for or will pay for the care or supervision of the adult child or in fact
provides or will provide substantialcare or personalsupervision of the adult child;
the financial resources available to both parentsfor the support, care and supervision of the adult child; and any other financial resources or other resources or
programs availablefor the support, care and supervision of the adult child.
(f) An order entered under this section may contain provisions governing the
rights,privileges, duties and powers of both parents with respect to the support of
the child, and may be modified and enforced as provided by this code.
SECTION 3. This Act takes effect on September 1, 1989, and applies to any
cause of action which is pending on that date or which is filed on or after that
date. This Act applies to any cause of action brought under this Act whether:
(1) the child is a minor or an adult; (2) the child was a minor or an adult on the
date that this Act or this code became effective; (3) a prior order affecting the
child was previously entered under this code or prior to the enactment of this
code under a predecessor statute or otherwise; or (4) no order affecting the child
was previously entered.
SECTION 4. The importance of this legislation and the crowded condition
of the calendars in both houses create an emergency and an imperative public
necessity that the constitutional rule requiring bills to be read on three several
days in each house be suspended, and this rule is hereby suspended.
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APPENDIX B-ORIGINAL TEXAS LEGISLATIVE
COUNCIL DRAFT
By Caperton

S.B. No. 298
A BILL TO BE ENTITLED
AN ACT

relating to support for a minor or adult disabled child.
BE IT ENACTED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF
TEXAS:
SECTION 1. Section 14.05(b), Family Code, is amended to read as follows:
(b) The court may order either or both parents to provide for the support of a
minor or adult disabled child for an indefinite period under Section 14.051 of this
code. [IF th
fi.ds that
.o. the hild,
.
whether institutionalize ot n.ot, equi

eentinuous et andJ personal suevso beeatts of a 1,mentalor physieft disa
bility and will nzot be able to supr himself, the. eourt may orde1 that Fa m
fet the supporit of the ehild shall be countinued afte. the. 18th birthday and x
ten~ded for an in 1definite Ferie. The eourt ma ente a oide, t~d this s~ubse
tion only if a Lequst fox a o der of e~ttended suppet wie this suseton has
bee made it. the original suit, a petition rte. stn futhe aetio. une Seeto
11.07 of this eede, ot a into to inedify
Sco.."14.08 of this eede filed
4F-

befete thec hild's 18th birthda.]
SECTION 2. Subchapter A, Chapter 14, Family Code, is amended by adding Section 14.051 to read as follows:
Sec. 14.051. SUPPORT FOR A MINOR OR ADULT DISABLED CHILD.

(a) In this section:
(1) "Adult child" means a child that is 18 years of age or older.
(2) "Child" means a son or daughter of any age.
(b) A court may order the support of a child for an indefinite period and determine the rights, privileges, duties, and powers of the child's parentsfor the support
of the child if the courtfinds that:
(]) because of a mental or physical disability, the child requires substantial
care and personalsupervision and is not able to be self-supporting, regardlessof
whether the child is institutionalized;and
(2) the disability exists, or the cause of the disability is known to exist, before
or on the 18th birthday of the child.
(c) An action under this section may be brought and maintained only by a
parent of the child. The parent may not transfer or assign the right to bring an
action under this section to any person, including a governmental or private entity
or agency
(d) An action under this section may be brought regardless of the age of the
child.
(e) An action under this section may be brought as an independent cause of
action or as an action joined with any other action brought under this code.
(f) If no court has continuingjurisdiction over the child, an action under this
section may be brought as an originalsuit affecting the parent-child relationship.
If there is a court of continuingjurisdiction over the child, an action under this
section may be brought as a petitionfor further action under Section 11. 07 of this
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code or a motion to modify under Section 14.08 of this code. If the child is a child
for the purposes of Section 14.05 of this code at the time an action to establish
support is brought, a court may enter orders under Section 14.05 or this section, or
both.
(g) In determiningthe amount of supportfor an adult child, the specific terms
and conditions of supportfor the adult child, and the rights,privileges, duties, and
powers of a parentfor the support of the adult child, the court shall consider:
(1) any existing or future needs of the child directly related to the child's
mental or physical disability and the substantialcare and personalsupervision
directly required by or related to the child's disability;
(2) whether the parent pays for or will payfor the care or supervision of the
child or provides or will provide substantialcare or personal supervision of the
child;
(3) the financialresources availableto each parentfor the support,care, and
supervision of the child; and
(4) any otherfinancial resourcesor other resources or programs availablefor
the support, care, and supervision of the child.
(h) An order under this section may be modified or enforced in the same manner as any other order under this title.
(i) Except as otherwise provided by this section, proceedings under this section
are the same as in a suit affecting the parent-child relationship.
0) This section does not affect a parent's:
(1) cause of action for the support of a disabledchild under any other law; or
(2) ability to contractfor the support of a disabled child.
(k) This section does not affect the substantive or proceduralrights or remedies
of a person other than a parent, including a governmental or private entity or
agency, with respect to the support of a disabled child under any other law.
SECTION 3. This Act takes effect September 1, 1989, and applies only to a
suit pending or filed on or after that date. A suit that was filed before the effective date of this Act and is not pending on or after that date is governed by the
law in effect at the time the suit was filed, and that law is continued in effect for
that purpose.
SECTION 4. The importance of this legislation and the crowded condition
of the calendars in both houses create an emergency and an imperative public
necessity that the constitutional rule requiring bills to be read on three several
days in each house be suspended, and this rule is hereby suspended.
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